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Workshop: New Trends in Mechanism Design

Programme and Presentations

Tuesday, 6 September

Presentations and full version papers

Session Chair: Peter Bogetoft

9.10 Welcome by Peter Bogetoft
9.15 Peter Cramton: Tutorial on Incentive Auctions
10.00 Break
10.15 Jason Hartline: Tutorial on Approximation in Mechanism Design
11.00 Break
11.15 Jason Hartline: Tutorial on Approximation in Mechanism Design (ctd)
12:00 General questions and discussion
12.15 Lunch break (lunch is on your own)

Session Chair: Felix Fischer

13.30 Hervé Moulin: The bipartite rationing problem (joint work with Jay Sethuraman)
14.15 Daniel Monte: The Daycare Assignment Problem: Matching in an Overlapping Generations Model
14.45 Coffee break
15.15 Peter Biro: Matching couples with Scarf's algorithm
15.45 Ron Lavi: Efficiency of Sequential English Auctions with Dynamic Arrivals
16.15 Jens Leth Hougaard: Truth-telling and Nash equilibria in minimum cost spanning tree models

Wednesday, 7 September

Session Chair: Peter Bogetoft

09.15 Peter Cramton: Tutorial on Medicare Auction Reform
10.00 Break
10.15 Tim Roughgarden: Tutorial on Algorithmic Mechanism Design
11.00 Break
11.15 Tim Roughgarden: Tutorial on Algorithmic Mechanism Design (ctd)
12.00 General questions and discussion
12.15 Lunch Break (lunch is on your own)

Session Chair: John Kennes

13.30

Jelle Duives: Mathematical Programming Approach to Multidimensional Mechanism Design for Single Machine Scheduling

14.00 Timo Heinrich: Reputation and Mechanism Choice in Procurement Auctions: An Experiment
14.30 Coffee break
15:00 René Kirkegaard: Ranking Asymmetric Auctions using the Dispersive Order
15.30 Felix Fischer: Payment Rules for Combinatorial Auctions via Structural Support Vector Machines
16.00 Panel Discussion - Chair: Peter Bogetoft

Thursday, 8 September

Session Chair: Peter Bogetoft

9.15 Nicole Immorlica: Optimal Auctions over Social Networks
10.00 Ning Chen: Mechanism Design without Money via Stable Matching
10.30 Break
11.00 Nick Gravin: On the power of random sampling in mechanism design
11:30 Rick Antle: The Zions Bancorp ESOARS Auctions of 2007 and 2008
12.15 Lunch break (lunch is on your own)

Session Chair: Jason Hartline

13.30

Norovsambuu Tumennasan: Whose Opinion Counts: Political Processes and the Implementation Process

14.00

Bartosz Kozlowski: Multi-Attribute Procurement Auctions with Ordered Weighted Reference Information

14.30 Coffee break

14.45

Kurt Nielsen: A Simplified Multiattribute Procurement Auction with Postponed Scoring by a Double Revelation Mechanism

15.15

Open discussion

19.00 Conference dinner

Friday, 9 September

Session Chair: Peter Bro Miltersen

09.15 Uriel Feige: Mechanism Design with Uncertain Inputs
10.15 Paul Dütting: Simplicity-Expressiveness Tradeoffs in Mechanism Design
11.00 Break
11.15 Jing Chen: Crowdsourced Bayesian auctions
12.00 Sven Seuken: Market User Interface Design
12.30 Goodbye