

The Zions Bancorp ESOARS Auctions of 2006, 2007 and 2008

by

Rick Antle, William S. Beinecke Professor of Accounting at Yale

prepared for

CFEM Workshop on New Trends in Mechanism Design Sept. 6-9, 2011



Yale SCHOOL OF MANAGEMENT

Purpose

- My only goal is to expose this audience to these auctions.
- (Relatively) Good models of (common?) value
 - Private information?
- Seller's incentives are conflicting
 - Low value for accounting (and their business of doing these auctions for others)
 - High value because they receive the proceeds.
- Rely mostly on work of CVI – see refs at end.

Outline

- Background
 - Accounting
 - Employee stock options
 - FASB 123R
- ESOARS
 - Employee Stock Option Appreciation Rights
- Auctions
- Questions

Accounting

- Fundamental Accounting Identity (balance sheet):

$$\text{Assets}_t - \text{Liabilities}_t = \text{Equities}_t$$

- And the related (income statement):

$$\Delta \text{Assets} - \Delta \text{Liabilities} = \Delta \text{Equities}$$

Δ equities represent either contributions from/
distributions to owners OR income/loss.

- Ponzi schemes

Working the Identity

- Economic concepts
- Accounting conventions (GAAP)
- Context


DRIVE

- Recognition
- Classification
- Valuation


Employee Stock Options

- Right to buy stock at a specific price, usually the stock price on the grant date.
- Issued by corporations to employees.
- Vesting requirements.
- Expiration dates.
- Redemption rules.
- Cannot be sold by the employee.

Employee Stock Option Timeline



FASB 123R: Grant Date Accounting



Zion's Bancorporation Auctions

- Zions proposed establishing grant date value of a vested option (P) by auctioning ESOARs – tracking securities that would pay investors 10% of the cash employees obtained through exercising their options.
- In June 2006 ran an auction with standard-looking rules – like Treasury auctions. Go down demand curve until market clears, price is first rejected bid.

Auction Rules: Mimics Treasury

- Bids: Price and quantity to be acquired at that price.
- Prices arrayed from highest to lowest in a simulated demand curve for the security.
- The actual sale price is determined as the highest price such that the aggregate of the offers at and above that price just consumes the supply.
- If total demand at the sale price exceeds supply, then the highest offers are satisfied first.




June 2006 ESOARS Auction Results

Reference ESOs	936,024
ESO Strike Price	\$81.15
ESOARS Assigned	93,603
Vesting / Expiration	3 Years / 7 Years
Market Clearing Price	\$7.50
Proceeds	\$702,075
Active Bidders	57
Winning Bidders	21
Institutional Bidders	5
Total Bids Received	1,041



ZIONS BANK®

Figure 1. Evolution of the 2006 ESOARS Auction Aggregate Demand Curve




From Zions' SEC Submission

- Expected life of their options was 4 years
- Annual dividend yield was 2%
- Interest rate was about 5%
- Volatility used in BS was 18% per year
 - close to both the historical volatility and the current implied volatility in the market.

Reasonableness Checks

- Using the Black-Scholes model, the life of the option on grant date would have to be about 2.2 years to recover the auction value of \$7.50
 - Implies ESOs would have to be exercised immediately upon vesting
- Alternatively, holding other parameters constant, the implied volatility which recovers the auction price is about 10% per year.
 - Only one company in the S&P 500 at the time had an implied volatility lower than 10%
 - Zions implied volatility ranked 79th out of the S&P 500.



May 2007 ESOARS Auction Results

Reference ESOs	994,180
ESO Strike Price	\$83.25
ESOARS Assigned	99,418
Vesting / Expiration	3 Years / 7 Years
Market Clearing Price	\$12.06
Proceeds	\$1.2 million
Active Bidders	43
Winning Bidders	21
Institutional Bidders	12
Total Bids Received	874




ZIONS BANK®



Yale SCHOOL OF MANAGEMENT

Source: Zions Presentation on internet.

Figure 2. Final Aggregate Demand Curve for the 2007 ESOARS Auction
(21 successful bidders, \$12.06 clearing price)




Source: Mazumdar et al, 2009.

April 2008 ESOARS Auction Results

- Units offered: 180,000
- Strike price: \$47.29
- Clearing price: \$5.56
- Proceeds: \$1,000,800

**Final Aggregate Demand Curve for 2008 ESOARS Auction:
31 Successful Bidders \$5.56 Clearing Price 180k Units**





Questions

- Why would a company do this?
 - Expensive
 - Already short options to their employees
 - No one besides Zions did (to the best of my knowledge)
- Why would a bidder enter?
 - Only one reason: To benefit from mispricing.
 - Is that reasonable here?

References

- Auction results: <https://www.auctions.zionsdirect.com/archive/esoars>
- Zions' PowerPoints accessed through
- Mazumdar, Sumon C., Nanda, Vikram K. and Surana, Rahul, Using Auctions to Price Employee Stock Options: The Case of Zions Bancorporation ESOARS (December 15, 2009). Financial Analysts Journal, Vol. 65, No. 6, 2009.
- Zions stock chart through <http://finance.yahoo.com/> accessed Sept. 6, 2011
- Zions Bancorporation ESOARS: An Evaluation, Compensation Valuation Inc., March 30, 2007.