Scafuro, A.
, Siniscalchi, L. & Visconti, I. (2021).
Publicly Verifiable Zero Knowledge from (Collapsing) Blockchains. In J. A. Garay (Ed.),
Public-Key Cryptography – PKC 2021: 24th IACR International Conference on Practice and Theory of Public Key Cryptography, Virtual Event, May 10–13, 2021, Proceedings, Part II (pp. 469-498). Springer Science and Business Media Deutschland GmbH.
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-75248-4_17
Baum, C., Braun, L., Delpech de Saint Guilhem, C., Klooß, M., Orsini, E.
, Roy, L. D. & Scholl, P. (2023).
Publicly Verifiable Zero-Knowledge and Post-Quantum Signatures from VOLE-in-the-Head. In H. Handschuh & A. Lysyanskaya (Eds.),
Advances in Cryptology: CRYPTO 2023 (pp. 581-615). Springer.
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-38554-4_19
Baum, C., Damgård, I. B. & Orlandi, C. (2014).
Publicly Auditable Secure Multi-Party Computation. In M. Abdalla & R. D. Prisco (Eds.),
Security and Cryptography for Networks: 9th International Conference, SCN 2014, Amalfi, Italy, September 3-5, 2014. Proceedings (pp. 175-196 ). Springer VS.
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-10879-7_11
Erkin, Z., Franz, M., Guajardo, J., Katzenbeisser, S., Lagendijk, I.
& Toft, T. (2009).
Privacy-Preserving Face Recognition.
Lecture Notes in Computer Science, 235-253.
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-03168-7_14
Vanegas, H., Cabarcas, D.
& Aranha, D. F. (2023).
Privacy-Preserving Edit Distance Computation Using Secret-Sharing Two-Party Computation. In A. Aly & M. Tibouchi (Eds.),
Progress in Cryptology – LATINCRYPT 2023: 8th International Conference on Cryptology and Information Security in Latin America, LATINCRYPT 2023, Quito, Ecuador, October 3–6, 2023, Proceedings (pp. 67-86). Springer.
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-44469-2_4
Frederiksen, T. K., Nielsen, J. B. & Orlandi, C. (2015).
Privacy-Free Garbled Circuits with Applications to Efficient Zero-Knowledge. In E. Oswald & M. Fischlin (Eds.),
Advances in Cryptology - EUROCRYPT 2015: 34th Annual International Conference on the Theory and Applications of Cryptographic Techniques, Sofia, Bulgaria, April 26-30, 2015, Proceedings, Part II (pp. 191-219). Springer VS.
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-46803-6_7
Meiklejohn, S.
& Orlandi, C. (2015).
Privacy-enhancing overlays in bitcoin. In M. Brenner , N. Christin , B. Johnson & K. Rohloff (Eds.),
Financial Cryptography and Data Security : FC 2015 International Workshops, BITCOIN, WAHC, and Wearable, San Juan, Puerto Rico, January 30, 2015, Revised Selected Papers (Vol. 8976, pp. 127-141). Springer.
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-48051-9_10
Aggarwal, D.
, Obremski, M., Ribeiro, J.
, Simkin, M. & Siniscalchi, L. (2022).
Privacy Amplification with Tamperable Memory via Non-Malleable Two-Source Extractors.
IEEE Transactions on Information Theory,
68(8), 5475-5495.
https://doi.org/10.1109/TIT.2022.3167404
B. S. Reis, T.
, Aranha, D. F. & Lopez, J. (2017).
PRESENT Runs Fast: Efficient and Secure Implementation in Software. In W. Fischer & N. Homma (Eds.),
Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems – CHES 2017 - 19th International Conference, Proceedings: 19th International Conference, Taipei, Taiwan, September 25-28, 2017, Proceedings (pp. 644-664). Springer.
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-66787-4_31
Damgård, I. B., Keller, M., Larraia , E.
, Pastro, V., Scholl, P. & Smart, N. P. (2013).
Practical Covertly Secure MPC for Dishonest Majority – or: Breaking the SPDZ Limits. In J. Crampton , S. Jajodia & K. Mayes (Eds.),
Computer Security – ESORICS 2013: 18th European Symposium on Research in Computer Security, Egham, UK, September 9-13, 2013. Proceedings (pp. 1-18 ). Springer VS.
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-40203-6_1
Chase, M., Derler, D., Goldfeder, S.
, Orlandi, C., Ramacher, S., Rechberger, C., Slamanig, D. & Zaverucha, G. (2017).
Post-Quantum Zero-Knowledge and Signatures from Symmetric-Key Primitives. In
CCS 2017 - Proceedings of the 2017 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security (pp. 1825-1842). Association for Computing Machinery.
https://doi.org/10.1145/3133956.3133997
Baum, C., Frederiksen, T. K., Hesse, J., Lehmann, A. & Yanai, A. (2020).
Pesto: Proactively secure distributed single sign-on, or how to trust a hacked server. In
Proceedings - 5th IEEE European Symposium on Security and Privacy, Euro S and P 2020 (pp. 587-606). Article 9230400 IEEE.
https://doi.org/10.1109/EuroSP48549.2020.00044