Deposit schemes for incentivizing behavior in finite games of perfect information


Nikolaj I. Schwartzbach

This widget computes deposit schemes to incentivize certain behavior in finite games of perfect information. Specifically, by augmenting a finite game G with a deposit scheme, we obtain ε-strong, t-robust game-theoretic security. This means the honest strategy profile s* is a t-robust subgame perfect equilibrium, and for every pure strategy s = (sC, s-C* ) with |C| ≤ t, and every iC, it holds that:

ui (s* ) ≥ ui (s) + ε

The widget is supplementary material to my working paper 'Deposit schemes for incentivizing honesty in finite games'.

Instructions

Both the tree and emissions matrix are inputted as raw JS code and parsed using eval(...).

Tree format Emissions format

Tree structure
Emission matrix
Minization

Additional properties
Ensures the utility for the honest strategy remains unchanged.
Ensures the deposit scheme does not lock away funds.
Security parameters
Output




Input game


Resulting game



jsLPsolver is used for solving the linear programs.

Department of Computer Science. Aarhus University