Deposit schemes for incentivizing behavior in finite games of perfect information
Nikolaj I. Schwartzbach
This widget computes deposit schemes to incentivize certain behavior in finite games of perfect information. Specifically, by augmenting a finite game G
with a deposit scheme, we obtain ε
-robust game-theoretic security. This means the honest strategy profile s*
is a t
-robust subgame perfect equilibrium, and for every pure strategy s
) with |C
| ≤ t
, and every i
, it holds that:
ui (s* ) ≥ ui (s) + ε
The widget is supplementary material to my working paper 'Deposit schemes for incentivizing honesty in finite games
Both the tree and emissions matrix are inputted as raw JS code and parsed using
- To make a leaf, use the syntax
ui is the payoff of player i.
- To make a branch, use the syntax
i is the index of the player to whom the node belongs, and
cj is the jth child.
- Note: in every branch there must be a unique honest child. To denote the honest strategy, use a star
* as suffix on the label, i.e.
- Emissions must be formatted as
m matrix, i.e.
k lists of size
k is an integer, denoting the number of symbols in the alphabet, and
m is the number of leaves in the game.
- Note: each column in the emissions matrix must be a pdf, i.e. each entry must be nonnegative and the columns should sum to one.
is used for solving the linear programs.
Department of Computer Science. Aarhus University