Spirea: A Mechanized Concurrent Separation Logic for Weak Persistent Memory

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Weak persistent memory (a.k.a. non-volatile memory) is an emerging technology that offers fast byte-addressable durable main memory. A wealth of algorithms and libraries has been developed to explore this exciting technology. As noted by others, this has led to a significant verification gap. Towards closing this gap, we present Spirea, the first concurrent separation logic for verification of programs under a weak persistent memory model. Spirea is based on the Iris and Perennial verification frameworks, and by combining features from these logics with novel techniques it supports high-level modular reasoning about crash-safe and thread-safe programs and libraries. Spirea is fully mechanized in the Coq proof assistant and allows for interactive development of proofs with the Iris Proof Mode. We use Spirea to verify several challenging examples with modular specifications. We show how our logic can verify thread-safety and crash-safety of non-blocking durable data structures with null-recovery, in particular the Treiber stack and the Michael-Scott queue adapted to persistent memory. This is the first time durable data structures have been verified with a program logic.

CCS Concepts: • Theory of computation → Separation logic; Logic and verification.

Additional Key Words and Phrases: weak memory, persistent memory, non-volatile memory, persistency, program verification, program logic, Iris

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1 INTRODUCTION

In the traditional storage hierarchy programmers can choose between fast, but volatile, main memory and non-volatile, but slower, secondary storage. Persistent memory (a.k.a. non-volatile memory) is an exciting emerging technology that, uniquely, offers both fast random access at byte granularity and persistence of data in the absence of power and across system crashes. It thus shakes up the traditional storage hierarchy with a new abstraction: storage that is suitable both as main memory and as durable storage of data.

A wealth of algorithms, libraries, and tools have been developed for persistent memory, exploring the new potential. This includes durable data structures [Cai et al. 2021; Friedman et al. 2018], memory allocators [Schwalb et al. 2015], garbage collectors [Cai et al. 2020], transactions [Ramalhete et al. 2021; Volos et al. 2011], key-value stores [Chen et al. 2020; Kaiyrakhmet et al. 2019], and language-level support for persistent memory [George et al. 2020], just to mention a few. An

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important class of data structures that is new and unique to persistent memory is durable datastructures with *null-recovery* [Izraelevitz et al. 2016]. These reside in persistent memory and are preserved across crashes with *no recovery being needed* after a crash to maintain their consistency.

Ensuring correctness when programming for persistent memory is, however, extremely challenging. Since data stored in persistent memory is expected to be permanent, programs for persistent memory must be *crash-safe*. Thus, programmers must ensure that if the system crashes (which can happen non-deterministically at any time, *e.g.*, due to power failure) then, after the crash, the content of the persistent memory should be in a consistent state from which recovery is possible.

Moreover, due to the volatile caches on contemporary CPUs, writes to persistent memory are buffered. They occur *asynchronously* and may reach persistent memory in a different order than the one in which they were carried out. This *persistent memory order* (or persist order) does not coincide with the *weak memory order*, the order in which the CPU guarantees that writes by one thread are made visible to other threads. Hence, a program can be correct for weak memory (by taking into account the weak memory order), but not correct for persistent memory (by failing to take the persistent memory order properly into account). To tame this non-determinism, modern instruction sets such as x86 and ARM offer various flush and fence instructions, which programmers can insert between writes to enforce a desired persist order. These instructions are expensive, though, and should only be used when necessary.

One solution to ensure correctness in the presence of these challenges is, of course, to formally verify programs for persistent memory using a program logic. However, as Raad et al. [2020a] identified, there is a significant *verification gap*: The development of algorithms and libraries for persistent memory is far ahead of formal verification techniques for persistent memory. As a first step towards closing this gap two program logics have been developed: Persistent Owicki-Gries (POG) [Raad et al. 2020a] and Pierogi [Bila et al. 2022]. Both are adaptations of the Owicki-Gries proof system and for reasoning about programs under the machine-level x86-TSO memory model. However, since these logics are based on Owicki-Gries they only support a very simple first-order sequential programming language and do not include features such as separation, (user defined) ghost state, higher-order reasoning, and abstract specifications. This results in a lack of modularity that is evident, for instance, in [Raad et al. 2020a], where to verify an example using a lock, the lock and the client of the lock are verified together using a global invariant with knowledge about the internals of both. It is not possible to give the lock an abstract specification, verify it in isolation, and reuse the specification with multiple clients. In contrast, modern concurrent separation logics (CSLs), such as Iris [Jung et al. 2018], scale to much richer programming languages and support the aforementioned features. We thus think that the next step to closing the verification gap is to develop a CSL for persistent memory, and that is exactly what we do in this paper.

### 1.1 Challenges

Prior work has explored the application of CSL to weak memory and to persistency individually. The RSL and GPS logics has spawned a line of logics for weak (but not persistent) memory [Doko and Vafeiadis 2016; Kaiser et al. 2017; Turon et al. 2014; Vafeiadis and Narayan 2013]. The Perennial logic, which is a state-of-the-art CSL for reasoning about crash-safety, and its predecessor Crash Hoare Logic applies to programs that use durable secondary storage (but without any weak behaviors) [Chajed 2022; Chajed et al. 2019, 2021; Chen et al. 2016]. These logics have been successful in their respective domains but no CSL has been developed for the *weak persistency* found in persistent memory. As persistent memory combines challenging aspects from both weak memory and persistency a natural approach is to learn from the above-mentioned logics and try to adapt their techniques into a logic for persistent memory. As it turns out, there are however serious obstacles to such an endeavor.
**Non-deterministic crashes.** In a strong persistency model, such as the one considered for Crash Hoare Logic and Perennial, crashes are deterministic. This means that if a crash occurs at a given program point the state of the machine after the crash is uniquely determined by its state before the crash at that program point. The durable storage is completely unaffected by the crash whereas the content of volatile memory is entirely lost. At the program logic level this means that some logical resources are kept unchanged at a crash while others are discarded. Perennial includes a post-crash modality, (PC), that carries out this transformation. All rules for their post-crash modality have the form $R \vdash (PC) R$, which means that the resource $R$ is preserved during a crash. If a resource $P$ is lost at a crash this is simply encoded by having no such rule for $P$.

For persistent memory the persistency model is weak due to the asynchronous nature of writes and fences. This means that the crash step is non-deterministic. As such, resources are not merely kept or lost at a crash; instead they are non-deterministically kept, discarded, or changed. Hence, the straightforward behavior of Perennial’s post-crash modality is no longer sufficient and its model, which relies on changing ghost names for lost resources, is not applicable either! We thus introduce a more sophisticated post-crash modality and prove it sound using a more subtle model.

**Sound invariants.** It is well-known that Iris-style invariants are unsound for weak memory. To overcome this, CSLs for weak memory have had to restrict invariants in various ways. One approach taken by GPS, iGPS and iRC11 is to associate invariants with specific locations and only allow access to their content when physically synchronizing with the location. We observe that in a persistent memory setting even these restricted invariants allows for resource transfer that is unsound for persistent memory. In particular, in weak memory if a RMW (read-modify-write) operation is successful then the overwritten value can never be read again by another RMW operation. The weak memory invariants rely on this property for certain types of resource transfer. But, in persistent memory, a write made by an RMW operation might be lost at a crash, and the overwritten value will then be observable again after the crash.

Additionally, we want invariants that are strong enough to handle durable data structures with null-recovery. The obvious way to encode at the logic level that a data-structure is preserved across crashed is to say that its invariant (inside its representation predicate) is preserved under the post-crash modality. However, it is not clear how an Iris invariant can soundly interact with a post-crash modality. Indeed, in Perennial, which uses Iris invariants, one cannot use the post-crash modality to establish that an invariant holds after a crash. Instead, Perennial relies on recovery code to establish new invariants after a crash, but this approach does not work for null-recovery where there is no recovery code.

A somewhat subtle point is that the issues with reconciling Iris invariants and crashes also pose challenges regarding modeling of the logic. Prior Iris-based logics for weak memory use Iris invariants internally to model their more restrictive user-level invariants. But if invariants can not survive crashes, then they can not be used in the model either.

**Persistent memory instructions.** Persistent memory models usually involve some combination of flushes and fences to restrict the persist order when necessary. These instructions are specific to persistent memory and are not addressed by prior separation logics. We consider a weak flush instruction that may be reordered with respect to other instructions up to a fence. As noted by Raad et al. [2020a] such a flush instruction is difficult to reason about as its effect does not take place at the program point of the flush. As for fences we consider both asynchronous fences and synchronous fences.
1.2 Our Contributions

This paper contributes Spirea, the first CSL for weak persistency in general and persistent memory in particular. We use the explicit epoch persistency model by Izraelevitz et al. [2016].¹ This model is a slight generalization of the x86 and the ARM persistency models which can be efficiently implemented on both processors. As the model is slightly weaker than x86 and ARM, programs that are proven correct for this model are correct for both x86 and ARM. Similarly, reasoning principles that apply for this model are more general and are sound also for x86 and ARM. As such, the ideas in Spirea are generally applicable and can also be used, for instance, in logics specifically for x86 and ARM. In §2 we give an intuitive account of the persistency model as well as the consistency model and explain the verification challenges in more detail. Izraelevitz et al. [2016] define the explicit epoch persistency model in a declarative style, as a number of ordering constraints on abstract histories. Such a formulation is not well-suited for reasoning in a CSL, so we recast their model as a view-based small-step operational semantics (see §5.1) that can be used with the Perennial and Iris logical frameworks. As our focus in this paper is squarely on the logic we do not establish a formal correspondence between Izraelevitz et al.’s formulation and ours but instead leave this to future work.

Our logic improves the state-of-the-art both in terms the programming language features it supports, the expressivity and power of the logic, and in the scope of the case studies we have verified. Our programming language \( \lambda_{pmem} \) includes many features that are not supported by the Owicki-Gries based logics, most importantly: dynamic allocation of references, dynamic forking of threads, functions (including higher-order recursive functions and closures), and compound data types. As for the logic, Spirea is a higher-order separation logic and includes all the usual features in Iris based separation logics (except for those that are unsound in our setting). For reasoning about crashes Spirea contains features equivalent to those of Perennial. We cover this background in §3.

To tackle the above-mentioned challenges, Spirea includes the following key innovations:

1. A resource changing posts crash modality that can account for the non-deterministic changes in resources at crashes under weak persistency. Our post-crash modality supports rules of the form \( R \vdash \langle \text{PC} \rangle R' \), where \( R' \) reflects how \( R \) is non-deterministically affected by the crash. We make this possible by modelling our post-crash modality using an exchange resource. This can be seen as a generalization of the model of Perennial’s post-crash modality: the Perennial model is the special case where the exchange resource is the empty resource.

2. Crash-aware invariants, which, in contrast to Iris-style and GPS-style invariants, are sound under weak persistency. Soundness of Spirea crash-aware invariants relies on having novel proof rules for transfer of resources in and out of invariants. Our Spirea invariants are crash-aware, meaning that they can be preserved under our post-crash modality and thus facilitate resource transfer between code executing before and after a crash. This is the first time a separation logic contains invariants that can be used to this end. We devise a novel model for our invariants that does not rely on Iris invariants.

3. An assortment of features to handle persistent memory instructions: Post-fence modalities, a post-crash flush modality, and state lower-bounds w.r.t. fences. These work in tandem to reason about weak flushes and synchronous and asynchronous fences.

We explain these in depth in §4 where we give a high level introduction to Spirea, explain its design, and present several examples.

¹Not to be confused with the (implicit) epoch persistency model which cannot be efficiently implemented on x86 or ARM.
Spirea and its high-level reasoning rule are modelled on top of a lower-level logic called BaseSpirea. This logic, in turn, is modelled using an instantiation of the Perennial program logic and using the Iris base logic. In §5 we state the soundness result in terms of the operational semantics. We have used the mechanization of our logic to formally verify a range of both a durable version of the Treiber stack and the Michael-Scott queue. This is the first time durable data structures have been verified with a program logic. For the latter we have verified crash-safety and thread-safety of both a durable version of the Treiber stack and the Michael-Scott queue. This is the first time durable data structures with null-recovery. For the latter we have verified crash-safety and thread-safety of both a durable version of the Treiber stack and the Michael-Scott queue. This is the first time durable data structures have been verified with a program logic. In §5 we state the soundness result in terms of the operational semantics. We also give an overview of the semantic model and the proof of soundness to the extent that space permits. For the full details regarding the model and the soundness proof we refer the reader to our mechanization.

Spirea and all our results are fully mechanized in the Coq proof assistant. The mechanization allows for interactive development of proofs using the Iris proof mode. The development is available online at https://github.com/logsem/spirea and as an artifact accompanying this paper [Vindum and Birkedal 2023a]. We have used the mechanization of our logic to formally verify a range of examples and case studies. We cover a number of these in §6. The case studies demonstrate how our logic is capable of verifying tricky synthetic examples, that it can give modular and compositional specifications to thread-safe and crash-safe libraries, and even verify entire durable data structures with null-recovery. For the latter we have verified crash-safety and thread-safety of both a durable version of the Treiber stack and the Michael-Scott queue. This is the first time durable data structures have been verified with a program logic.

In §7 we discuss related and future work.

2 PERSISTENT MEMORY VERIFICATION CHALLENGES

Before we can introduce Spirea we must first understand the kinds of programs that it aims to verify correctness of and the challenges involved in this. To this end we introduce our programming language λpmem. Its syntax is seen in Fig. 1. We use highlighted text to indicate the parts of the language that are related to persistent memory only. Loosely speaking, if we erased those parts we would get a language for weak, but not persistent, memory.

λpmem is a lambda-calculus with standard features (recursive functions, booleans, products, sums, etc.), fork-based concurrency, references with dynamic allocation, and operations for weak persistent memory. The expression fork e spawns a new thread that evaluates e in parallel with existing
threads. We use the notation \( e_1 \parallel e_2 \) for the parallel execution of \( e_1 \) and \( e_2 \), which is derivable from fork. We define assert to be function that is unsafe (gets stuck) if its argument is not true. The language features a weak persistent memory model. The full formal operational semantics appears in the appendix [Vindum and Birkedal 2023b]. In this section we give an intuitive explanation of the memory model illustrated by the examples in Fig. 2. But first we fix some terminology.

A consistency model specifies the semantics of shared memory by restricting the weak memory order, the order of memory operations across threads. A concurrent program that correctly accounts for interleavings and the weak memory order is thread-safe. A persistence model specifies the semantics of persistent memory by restricting the persist order, the order in which writes may reach the persistent memory [Pelley et al. 2014]. A program using durable storage that correctly accounts for crashes and the persist order is crash-safe. The mentioned orders are defined using the program order, the order in which memory operations are issued by the program.

2.1 Release-Acquire and Non-Atomic Consistency

We use a highly relaxed consistency model closely resembling the release-acquire and non-atomic fragment of C11.\(^2\) The memory operations for allocations (ref\(_a\)), writes (\(=\_a\)), and reads (\(!\_a\)) are annotated with a memory access mode \(a \in \{\text{na}, \text{at}\}\). Allocations are considered a form of writes in the memory model. The access modes na and at are non-atomic and atomic access, respectively.

Non-atomic access is to be used when there are no races on data. For instance, when a thread uses a location exclusively or when synchronization has been established through other means, e.g., through a lock or atomic operations (explained below). Non-atomic writes (\(=\_\text{na}\)) performed by one thread give no guarantees on the order in which other threads may see them. This implies that it would be unsafe to use a non-atomic write to \(y\) in the example in Fig. 2a. The right thread might read 1 from \(y\) without also reading 37 from \(x\).

To ensure a desired weak memory order across threads, atomic access must be used. An atomic write (\(=\_\text{at}\)) is called a release-write and an atomic read (\(!\_\text{at}\)) is called an acquire-read. If an acquire-read reads a value written by a release-write we say that the acquire-read synchronizes with the release-write. In this case, the write is ordered before the read in the weak memory order. Furthermore, a release-write is ordered after all preceding (in program order) memory operations, and an acquire-read is ordered before all succeeding (in program order) reads and writes. Together, this means that when a thread, call it \(t_1\), performs an acquire-read and synchronizes with a release-write of another thread, say \(t_2\), then \(t_1\) becomes "aware of" (or acquires) all the writes that \(t_2\) was aware of at the time of writing. This is exemplified by the message passing (MP) example in Fig. 2a where the use of atomic operations make the assertion safe. When the sender thread writes 1 to \(y\) it is aware of the write of 37 to \(x\) (since it wrote it itself, program order). Hence, if the receiving thread reads 1 from \(y\) it also becomes aware of the write to \(x\), thus the following read of \(x\) is certain to yield 37, and the assert will succeed.

The read-modify-write (RMW) operations CAS (compare-and-set) and FAA (fetch-and-add) count as both an acquire-read and a release-write at the same time.

2.2 Explicit Epoch Persistency

We use the examples in Figs. 2b to 2d to explain the memory model we use. The notation \(e \cup e_r\) denotes execution of \(e\) with \(e_r\) configured as recovery code.\(^3\) We use the explicit epoch persistency model by Izraelevitz et al. [2016]. As they argue this persistency model is a slight generalization

\(^2\)The largest deviation from C11 is that we make no attempt to rule out data races on non-atomics which is undefined behavior in C11. This can be done with a race-detector [Dang et al. 2020; Kaiser et al. 2017]—we avoid that here for simplicity.

\(^3\)Note, that this is not syntax in the programming language.
of the x86 and ARM machine level persistency models. The model includes three operations to manage the persist order: an explicit flush, \texttt{flush} (also called a write-back), an asynchronous fence, \texttt{fence}, and a synchronous fence, \texttt{fence}_{\texttt{sync}}. In the absence of these instructions, no guarantees are given on the persist order. For instance, it is not safe to run the left-hand side of Fig. 2a with the recovery code in Fig. 2b. As there are no flushes or fences, the two writes might persist in any order: after a crash the recovery code might see $y$ being 1 and $x$ still being 0, even though, during normal execution, this would never be observable due to the release-write.

To enforce a certain persist order one must explicitly flush writes and then end an epoch with a fence. An asynchronous fence ensures that all writes that have been flushed before the fence persist prior to any writes after the fence. The asynchronous fence does not ensure that the flushed writes have actually been persisted; hence, if a crash happens after the fence, the writes flushed prior to it might still be lost. But, when a certain persist order has been established, recovery code can perform a kind of "backwards reasoning". For instance, in Fig. 2c the flush and fence implies that the write to $x$ persists before the write to $y$. Hence the recovery code can read $y$, and then, if the read yielded 1, reason backwards through the persist order and conclude that it is now certain to read 37 from $x$. This makes the assertion in Fig. 2c safe. A synchronous fence, is stronger, but also potentially slower, than an asynchronous fence. It additionally blocks execution until all flushed writes have actually reached persistent memory. This means that had Fig. 2c used a synchronous fence, then the write to $x$ would have been persisted with certainty after executing the program.

Flushes and fences interact with release-writes and acquire-reads as a way to "connect" the weak memory order and the persist order. If an acquire-read synchronizes with a release-write then anything flushed and fenced prior to the release-write is guaranteed to persist before anything following a fence after the acquire-read. In the durable MP example in Fig. 2b this ensures that the write to $z$ in the right thread must persist after the write to $x$ in the left thread and hence that the assertion made at recovery is safe. Note that the fence after the acquire-read of $y$ is necessary. When performing an acquire-read a thread immediately gains knowledge of the writes the releasing thread know about. But, only after a fence does it gain knowledge about flushed and fenced writes known to the releasing thread. Note also that flushes without fences provide no ordering guarantees with respect to atomic operations.

The optimized durable MP example in Fig. 2d is similar to the durable MP example except that the left thread does not flush the write to $x$ before sending it through $y$. Hence, when the right threads read 1 from $y$ it is still certain to know about the write to $x$ (as in Fig. 2a), but it no longer receives knowledge about the write being flushed. Hence, the right thread must flush $x$. With this being done it is still the case that the write to $z$ persists after the write to $x$. But, it is no longer the case that the write to $x$ will persist before the write to $y$. This brings us to the crucial point regarding this example: reading 1 from $y$ carries with it different information to a concurrent thread (which gains knowledge that $x$ holds 37) than it does to recovery code (which gains nothing). In Fig. 2b it would also have been safe for the recovery code to read $y$ instead of $z$, but here this would not be safe. At the logic level, this means that the resources associated with the write to $y$ in Fig. 2d must change at a crash, but it need not change in Fig. 2b.

The next section introduces Spirea. Readers who first want to see the full formal operational semantics can find these in the appendix [Vindum and Birkedal 2023b] before proceeding.

3 BACKGROUND: CRASH REASONING FEATURES IN PERENNIAL
Perennial extends Hoare logic with a crash Hoare quadruple of the form \{\textit{P}\} e \{\textit{Q}\}\{\textit{Q}_c\}. Here \textit{P} and \textit{Q} are standard pre- and postconditions. The fourth component \textit{Q}_c is a crash condition that must hold during every step of execution of \textit{e}. Since \textit{Q}_c holds at every step, if a crash occurs at
some point, then $Q_c$ will necessarily hold at that point. Hence, the crash-condition is a property that recovery code can rely on after a crash.

In addition to standard language independent structural rules (a frame rule, a bind rule, etc.), the key rule for deriving a crash Hoare quadruple is $\text{Htc-atomic}$ seen in Fig. 3. The rule states that to prove a crash Hoare quadruple for an atomic expression $e$, it suffices to prove that the pre-condition implies $Q_c$ and an ordinary Hoare triple for $e$ with $Q_c$ added to the postcondition. Since $e$ is atomic and can take only a single step, it suffices to show the crash condition before and after this single step. Note the use of the standard (non-separating) conjunction $\land$. This makes it possible to use all the resources one has at hand to show both $Q$ and $Q_c$. This is a crucial aspect of crash conditions: they can be established without losing the resources necessary to show them. The use of $\land$ is sound since, when the program runs, it will either take a normal step of execution (in which case the proof of $Q$ is needed) or crash (in which case the proof of $Q_c$ is needed). Since both cannot happen at the same time, it is not necessary to show the two conjuncts for disjoint resources. The $\text{Htc-atomic}$ rule is important since it, in combination with the structural rules, allows us to show a crash Hoare quadruple by showing a normal Hoare triple at each step. This explains why we show rules for normal Hoare triples later in §4.

To show crash-safety Perennial offers recovery Hoare quadruples of the form $\{P\} e \cup e_r \{Q\} \{Q_r\}$. The intuitive reading is: given that $P$ holds initially, it is safe to execute $e$ with the recovery program $e_r$. If $e$ terminates in a value $v$ without crashing then $Q(v)$ holds. If, on the other hand, one or more crashes occur during execution (of $e$ and $e_r$) and $e_r$ terminates in a value $v$, then $Q_r(v)$ holds.

Per the idempotence rule $\text{Htr-idempotence}$ one can show a recovery Hoare quadruple for a program $e$ and recovery program $e_r$ by showing a crash Hoare quadruple for $e$ and one for $e_r$. In both cases the crash condition is $Q_r$, such that $e_r$ can rely on this resource; not directly though, as the crash itself might change $Q_r$, hence the inclusion of the post-crash modality. Since $e_r$ itself maintains the crash condition $Q_r$, any number of crashes during $e_r$ are still safe.

In summary, the proof burden for proving crash-safety is to pick a crash condition and apply $\text{Htr-idempotence}$. Then one verifies two crash Hoare quadruples. The verification of these is similar to using normal Hoare triples except that the crash condition must be shown at every step.  

4 SPIREA

Spirea is a CSL based on the Iris separation logic framework. As such it contains all the standard connectives from Iris-based separation logics such as the separating conjunction, ghost state, higher-order quantifiers, etc. For reasoning about programs it offers Hoare triples, recovery Hoare quadruples, and crash Hoare quadruples. The latter two support the same rules as they do in Perennial. In this section we explain the novel aspects of Spirea. Throughout the section we cover the verification of the two examples from Fig. 2a and Fig. 2c; proof outlines are shown in Fig. 7 and Fig. 8.

Knowledge vs. resources. In Iris a persistent proposition is one that does not entail ownership but only represents duplicable knowledge. $\Box P$ means that $P$ always holds, and a proposition $P$ is

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4 This is in contrast to normal Iris invariants, where one has to sacrifice ownership of the resources necessary to show the invariant.

5 Showing the crash condition is usually trivial and can be automated with a Coq tactic.
well-known ones) as explanations of, the definition throughout the section. That we have yet to see, but these can be ignored for now. We will refer back to, and provide about Iris invariants. We start things off with the definition. The definition uses concepts in Spirea are monadic (they satisfy basic structural rules such as order to avoid having to introduce a plethora of symbols, we denote modalities (except already "knowledge" to mean persistent propositions. For example, \( \psi_1, \psi_2, \ldots, \psi_n \) are the propositions in Spirea: A Mechanized Concurrent Separation Logic for Weak Persistent Memory 244:9

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{PC-NA-MAPSTO} & \quad (PF) P \vdash \langle PF \rangle P \quad \text{PC-PERSIST-LB} & \quad (PC) \vdash (PF) P \\
\quad \ell \mapsto_{\text{at}} \sigma & \quad \exists \sigma, \ell \mapsto_{\text{at}} \psi_1, \ldots, \psi_n \equiv \sigma. \text{crashedIn}(\ell, \sigma) & \quad \text{REC-IN-AGREE} \\
\end{align*}
\]

Fig. 4. General rules for modalities

Rules for the post-crash modality

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{PC-NA-MAPSTO} & \quad (PF) \langle NF \rangle P \vdash P \\
\quad \ell & \mapsto_{\text{at}} \sigma, \sigma_1, \ldots, \sigma_n & \quad \exists \sigma, \ell \mapsto_{\text{at}} \psi, \psi_1, \ldots, \psi_n \equiv \sigma. \text{crashedIn}(\ell, \sigma) \\
\end{align*}
\]

persistent if \( P \vdash \Box P \). To avoid confusion with the different notions of "persistent" we use the word "knowledge" to mean persistent propositions. For example, \( n = 37 \) is knowledge and \( \ell \mapsto_{\text{at}} 37 \) is not.

Conventions for modalities. As we will see, Spirea contains a healthy number of modalities. In order to avoid having to introduce a plethora of symbols, we denote modalities (except already well-known ones) as \( \langle M \rangle \) where \( M \) is a mnemonic for the modality. All of our modalities satisfy basic structural rules such as \textsc{mod-sep} and \textsc{mod-mono} seen in Fig. 4. Additionally, some modalities are monadic (they satisfy \textsc{mod-intro, etc.}) or comonadic (they satisfy \textsc{mod-elim, etc.}).

Crash-Aware Invariants. As mentioned, one of the key innovations in Spirea is crash-aware invariants (or just invariants for short when it is clear from the context that we are not talking about Iris invariants). We start things off with the definition. The definition uses concepts in Spirea that we have yet to see, but these can be ignored for now. We will refer back to, and provide explanations of, the definition throughout the section.

\[\text{Definition 4.1. A crash-aware invariant } \pi \text{ consists of: a set of states } \Sigma, \text{ a preorder } \sqsubseteq \text{ on } \Sigma, \text{ a write assertion } \phi : \Sigma \times \text{Val} \rightarrow \text{dProp} (\text{dProp is the type of propositions in Spirea}), \text{ and a state-change function } \psi : \Sigma \rightarrow \Sigma \text{ that is monotone w.r.t. } \sqsubseteq. \text{ The data must satisfy the following two conditions:} \]

\[\begin{align*}
(1) \forall \sigma \in \Sigma, v \in \text{Val}. \phi(\sigma, v) & \vdash \langle NB \rangle \phi(\sigma, v) \\
(2) \forall \sigma \in \Sigma, v \in \text{Val}. \phi(\sigma, v) & \vdash \langle PCF \rangle \phi(\psi(\sigma), v).
\end{align*}\]

For an invariant \( \pi \) we refer to its components, say \( \phi, \pi, \phi, \) but more often we just write \( \phi \) when it is clear from context which invariant the component is from.
In the logic every location $\ell$ is associated with a specific invariant $\pi$ throughout its lifetime. This invariant is chosen dynamically when the location is allocated by using the rules $\textsc{ht-na-alloc}$ and $\textsc{ht-at-alloc}$ that appear in Fig. 6. In these rules the invariant assertion $[\ell \pi]$ appears in the postcondition. It denotes the knowledge that $\ell$ is associated with $\pi$. On the first line of the proof outlines (Fig. 7 and Fig. 8) we see invariant assertions for both $x$ and $y$. For such preexisting locations invariants can be picked at the beginning of the proof (we will see the details in §5.2). The invariant assertions hold throughout the proofs, but to avoid clutter in the outlines we do not repeat unchanged resources.

**Invariant States.** Consider a thread reading $y$ in parallel with the sending thread in Fig. 7. Such a thread can observe the initial value of 0, the final value of 1, and once it sees the latter it never sees the former again. We can represent the situation with a state transition system (STS): $y$ can be in one of the two states $\perp$ and $\top$ (corresponding to 0 and 1 respectively) and it can transition from $\perp$.
We need to transfer ownership over the points-to predicate for non-atomic locations. When we use a non-atomic points-to predicate for a location, we pick the following write assertion for every write to the location governed by the invariant, say with value \( v \) and state \( \sigma \), the assertion \( \phi(\sigma, v) \) holds.

As a simple example, in both Fig. 7 and Fig. 8 we pick the following write assertion for \( x \):

\[
\phi_x(\sigma, v) \triangleq (\sigma = \bot \times v = 0) \lor (\sigma = \top \times v = 37).
\]

The write assertion gives meaning to the states by establishing a correspondence between them and specific values. Having the state determine the value in this way is a common pattern. Since \( x \) is not used for resource transfer this suffices for its write assertion. When we verify the message passing example below we see an example where resource transfer is needed.

**Points-To Predicates.** Points-to predicates in Spirea have the form \( \ell \xleftarrow{a} \sigma \). Here \( \sigma \) is a sequence of states that has been written to \( \ell \).\(^6\) When \( a \) is na (respectively at) we say that the points-to predicate is non-atomic (atomic) and the location can then only be accessed using the na (at) access mode. On the first line in Fig. 7 we use a non-atomic points-to predicate for \( x \) and an atomic one for \( y \).

The non-atomic points-to predicate entails exclusive ownership over \( \ell \) and supports fractional permissions, denoted \( \ell \xleftarrow{q} \sigma \) for a fraction \( q \in (0; 1] \). (As usual, we often omit the fraction \( q \) if it is 1.) Hence, in Fig. 7 we need to transfer ownership over the points-to predicate for \( x \) from the left thread to the right thread. The sequence \( \sigma \) contains (at least) all writes that can ever be read again, both before and after a crash. It may be surprising that we use a sequence of states for non-atomic prior logics for weak memory have been able to establish “normal” points-to predicates for non-atomic locations that associate a location with a single value, thereby completely hiding the weak semantics. However, this is not possible in the persistent setting, where the asynchronicity of writes and the fact that crashes are ever-present (in contrast to data-races that can be avoided) means that at least some old states must be remembered. For instance, in Fig. 8, at the end of executing the right thread we have the resource \( x \xleftarrow{\text{na}} [\bot, \top] \). This preserves the precise information that after a crash \( x \) can have the value 0 or 37.

The atomic points-to predicate does not entail ownership and is knowledge. Hence, several threads can access atomic locations in parallel. This is needed for \( y \) in Fig. 7 where both threads own \( y \) initially. Since several threads can write to an atomic location without any synchronization the sequence of states \( \sigma \) is only partial. Other threads may have performed writes that the current thread is not aware of and that are thus not in \( \sigma \). Hence, for the atomic points-to predicate states can freely be dropped and, in practice, it often suffices to remember only the latest write. Therefore,

---

\(^6\)By convention, we name sequences with arrows \( \sigma \) and use juxtaposition for concatenation. For instance, \( \sigma \sigma \) is a sequence starting with \( \sigma \) and ending with \( \sigma \). For a concrete sequence we sometimes use list notation, as in \([\sigma_1, \sigma_2, \sigma_3] \).
and as the rules that take advantage of the entire sequence of states in the atomic case are fairly involved, in the remainder of the paper we only use the atomic points-to predicate with a single state and present specialized proof rules for this simpler case.

**Message Passing Example.** The message passing example contains reads and writes of all kinds. This makes it a great example to explain the read and write rules in Spirea and to see how invariants facilitate resource transfer between threads. We start with the write assertion for $y$:

$$
\phi_{y, mp}(\bot, v) \triangleq v = 0 \cdot tok_0 \\
\phi_{y, mp}(T, v) \triangleq v = 1 \cdot (x \leftarrow_{na} [\bot, T] \lor tok_1)
$$

The equalities on $v$ should be clear. The two tokens, $tok_0$ and $tok_1$, are exclusive: Only one of each exist and hence $tok_n \cdot tok_n$ is a contradiction (i.e., it implies false). This is a standard construction using Iris ghost state. The purpose of these tokens and the disjunction is best explained in the proof.

Notice how we split the initial resources from the first to the second line in Fig. 7. The left thread gets the non-atomic points-to predicate for $x$ and the right thread gets the token $tok_1$. The rest is knowledge, so both threads get a copy. We now cover the two writes and the two reads.

**Non-atomic write ($x :=_{na} 37$).** The rule $\text{HT-na-write}$ states that to write $v$ to a non-atomic location one must pick a target state $\sigma_t$. We choose $T$. The precondition requires an invariant assertion, a points-to predicate, that the write assertion holds, and that the new state preserves the order of the states. All of these are trivial: we have an invariant assertion, a points-to predicate ending in the state $\bot$, $\phi_x(T, 37)$ is immediate from the definition in eq. (1), and $\bot \subseteq T$ per definition. In the postcondition we receive an updated points-to predicate with the newly written state appended at the end. Non-atomic writes are usually this trivial, as precise information about them is known.

**Atomic write ($y :=_{at} 1$).** The first line of the precondition of $\text{HT-at-write}$ is similar to what we just saw for non-atomic. We pick the state $T$ for the write and show the write assertion by choosing the left side of the disjunction and using our points-predicate for $x$. That is, we transfer ownership over $x$ into the invariant. The conjunct on the second line of the precondition of $\text{HT-at-write}$ serves to maintain the monotone order of writes. Since atomic locations can be shared, we need to account for potential racy writes to the location. The universally quantified $\sigma_c$ represents such a write and the obligation is to show that it and the written state $\sigma_t$ can transition between each other, $\sigma_c \subseteq \sigma_t$ and $\sigma_t \subseteq \sigma_c$. This ensures that they are equivalent w.r.t. the preorder and that the order of the states is preserved no matter which of the two racy writes end up first in the memory order. To show this obligation the writer can assume the assertion of both the original state $\sigma$, the concurrent state $\sigma_c$, and the written state $\sigma_t$. If we look at the whole program we are verifying it is clear that there are no concurrent writes to $y$. But, as we are verifying the left thread modularly in isolation, we must be able to draw this conclusion based solely on the invariant. To this end, we assume some concurrent write $\sigma_c$ and must show $\sigma_c \subseteq T \subseteq \sigma_c$. If $\sigma_c = T$ the conclusion is trivial. If the $\sigma_c = \bot$ the conclusion is impossible. Fortunately, in this case we have the invariant for $\bot$ twice, hence we have the token $tok_0$ twice, which is a contradiction. Intuitively, the token $tok_0$ represents the right to write $\bot$ to $x$, and since only one token exists, this state can only ever be written once.

**Atomic read ($l_{at}, y$).** Now in the right thread we apply $\text{HT-at-read}$. At the present time we can ignore the $\langle \text{obj} \rangle$ and $\langle \text{PF} \rangle$ in the rule. We have the invariant and the points-to predicate required in the precondition. The last conjunct lets us open the invariant, access its content, and potentially transfer resources in and out of the invariant. The resource $Q$ represents the resources that we want to transfer out of the invariant. We use

$$Q(\bot, v) \triangleq v = 0 \\
Q(T, v) \triangleq v = 1 \cdot x \leftarrow_{na} [\bot, T]$$

Hence, if we read 1 we transfer the points-to predicate for $x$ out. We need to show the wand in $\text{HT-at-read}$. For some read state $\sigma_r$ and value $v_r$, the reader receives the invariant $\phi(\sigma_r, v_r)$ (the antecedent of the wand). We now have access to the content of the invariant, but, since the invariant
also appears in the consequent the access is temporary—we say that we have to close the invariant. If \( \sigma_r = \bot \) then \( Q(\bot, v_r) \) is plain knowledge and showing it and the invariant is trivial. If \( \sigma_r = \top \) then we use \( x \leftarrow_{\text{na}} [\bot, \tau] \) to show \( Q(\tau, v_r) \). However, now we can not use this points-to predicate to close the invariant. Fortunately, the invariant contains a disjunction and we can show the right disjunct using the tok\(_1\) that the right thread owns. That is, we transfer tok\(_1\) in to the invariant in order to transfer \( x \leftarrow_{\text{na}} [\bot, \tau] \) out of the invariant. This sort of reasoning is well-known to readers familiar with Iris invariants, but it is in fact significantly stronger than the read rule in GPS and iGPS. In these logics, a read can only transfer knowledge out of the invariant—transferring ownership over resources is not possible! Returning to the proof, having shown the preconditions for the read, we now get \( Q \) in the postcondition. The case where we read \( 0 \) is trivial, so we consider the case where we read \( 1 \) and enter the branch. In this case we have the points-to predicate for \( x \) after the read, as shown in the proof outline. All that remains is to show that the read of \( x \) yields 37.

Non-atomic read \( (\text{na } x) \). We apply \text{Ht-na-read} which is much like the read rule for atomics, which we just went through. The notable difference is that for a non-atomic is it certain that the last state in the points-to predicate (\( \sigma \) in the rule) is read. Hence, the rule does not quantify over some read state. When applying the rule we pick \( Q(u) \triangleq u = 37 \), which is easy to show when opening the invariant, and which gives us what we need.

\text{RMW Operations}. We have now seen the rules for reading and writing. Spirea also contains rules for the RMW operations \text{CAS} and \text{FAA}. We do not include these rules for space reasons and since they are rather complex. Since RMW operations are simultaneously both a read and a write, our rules for these essentially combine the read and the write rule. The rules require that the write assertion is shown for the read value (like \text{Ht-at-read} and the written value (like \text{Ht-at-write}). This is in contrast to other CSLs for weak memory, where the equivalent notion to our write assertion would not have to be shown for the read value. This makes resource transfer through RMW operations more restricted, but ensures that invariants are sound. In §6.2 we show how to combine Spirea with BaseSpirea for examples where the CAS rule is not strong enough, in §6.3 we see an example where the CAS rule is sufficient, and we discuss the limitation further in §7.

\text{Flushes and Fences}. To verify programs using flushes and fences we need assertions that capture the knowledge gained by these operations. Consider the pre-crash code in Fig. 8. Just after writing to \( x \) the thread merely knows that the write with state \( \tau \) exists (which implies that a successive read reads this or a more recent state). Knowledge of this form is captured by the store lower bound assertion \( \ell \gtrdot s \sigma \). The program then flushes \( x \) and carries out an asynchronous fence. After this the thread knows that the write will persist before any succeeding writes. This form of knowledge is represented by the flush lower bound \( \ell \gtrdot \tau \sigma \). Suppose the program had instead carried out a synchronous fence. The thread would then know that the write had been saved to persistent memory. The persist lower bound \( \ell \gtrdot p \sigma \) represents this knowledge.

These assertions are lower bounds, in the sense that \( \ell \gtrdot \tau \sigma \) implies knowledge of a write in at least state \( \sigma \) but not that this is necessarily the most recent state. This, together with the fact that states grow monotonically, makes the assertions knowledge (\text{lb-knowledge}). The three lower bound relations are ordered as shown in \text{lb-persistent-flush-store} since a state is written before it is flushed, and since a synchronous fence is strictly stronger than an asynchronous fence.

Following the above, the effect of flushing a location \( \ell \) and a fence is then that the most recent write \( \sigma \) known to the flushing thread advances from \( \ell \gtrdot s \sigma \) to \( \ell \gtrdot \tau \sigma \) (in the case of an asynchronous fence) or to \( \ell \gtrdot p \ell \) (in the case of a synchronous). The rules for flush and fence should achieve this while taking the following three things into account: (1) \text{flush} and \text{fence} are two separate operations and the fence may not necessarily immediately follow the flush. (2) A fence can apply to arbitrarily many preceding flushes. (3) A fence is not only used in combination with a flush. As in
Fig. 2b it is also used in combination with an acquire-read to acquire persist information from the release-write. We want our program rules to support all these usage patterns. To this end Spirea includes two fence modalities: (PF) and (PF₅). The assertions (PF) P and (PF₅) P mean that P holds after the next asynchronous fence and synchronous fence, respectively.

In Fig. 8 we apply HT-flush at the flush operation. The precondition takes a store lower bound that we can extract from \( x \leftarrow_{\text{no}} \bot \top \) using MAPSTO-STORE-LB. The postcondition contains both a flush lower bound under (PF) and a persist lower bound under (PF₅) such that the flush can later be matched with both types of fences. In our case we only need the flush lower bound. At fence we use HT-fence. This rule (and HT-fence-sync) exactly matches the intuition of the fence modalities. If P holds under a fence modality, then executing a fence eliminates the modality. In our case this means that we have the flush lower bound after the fence. Note, that since the fence modalities are modalities and have a separation rule (as MOD-sep) the result from several flushes can be combined and extracted with a single fence. In the rule HT-at-read the extracted resource Q is under a fence modality which enforces that a fence be used when necessary. As such, using modalities for fences neatly achieves the requirements stated above.

To conclude the proof of the pre-crash program in Fig. 8 we define the write assertion for y

\[
\phi_{y,y}(\sigma, v) \doteq (\sigma = \bot * v = 0) \lor (\sigma = \top * v = 1 * x \geq f \top).
\]  

The assertion contains a flush lower bound for x when y has the state \( \top \). To prove this at the write to y we use the flush lower bound gained from the flush and the fence. In the next section we see how this is used to verify the recovery code.

Non-Deterministic Post-Crash Modality. To verify the entire flush and fence example, including the recovery code, we apply HT-idempotence where we must pick a crash condition \( Q_c \). The R in the rule is the precondition for the recovery code in Fig. 8. As a crash condition we pick \( \langle \text{PC} \rangle R \). Using the post-crash modality directly in the crash condition like this is common in Spirea as it turns out to be the most convenient approach in practice. Proving the wand for \( R \) in HT-idempotence becomes trivial, and the proof effort is concentrated on showing the crash condition at every step. In order to do this, we need to understand how our post-crash modality works. The rules for it appear in the lower half of Fig. 5.

Consider how an invariant \( [\ell] \pi \) should change at a crash. As we have mentioned, our invariants are crash-aware, and we want them to survive crashes. At the same time our programming language supports allocation, and since allocations might not persist before a crash, locations can be entirely lost at crashes. If a location is not lost after a crash, we say that it was recovered after the crash, and only in this case would it make sense still to have an invariant assertion for it. Such a situation is common, and we capture it by an if-recovered modality: the assertion (ifRec) \( \ell \) \( P \) mean that if the location \( \ell \) was recovered at the last crash, then \( P \) (which would typically mention \( \ell \)) holds. The rule PC-invariant is now clear: it preserves invariants for locations as long as they are recovered.

The if-recovered modality captures some of the non-determinism at a crash. Additional non-determinism is present in the rule PC-na-mapsto for non-atomic points-to predicates. Here the non-determinism is represented by the existential quantifier. The rule states that, for some i, only the first i states of the points-to predicate exist after the crash (ignore the \( \psi \) in the rule for now, it is explained later in the section). For state \( \sigma_i \), the rule contains the assertion crashedIn(\( \ell, \sigma_i \)). The meaning of this assertion is that \( \sigma_i \) is the most recent recovered state for \( \ell \), which is exactly how it is used in the rule. Only one such state exists so two such assertion must agree on the state Rec-in-agree. The crashedIn(\( \ell, \sigma_i \)) assertion also implies that \( \ell \) was in fact recovered and it can thus be used to eliminate the if-recovered modality as seen in Rec-in-if-rec.
The only way to know with certainty that a location will be recovered is through a persistent lower bound \( \ell \geq_p \sigma \). Per PC-PERSIST-LB a persistent lower bound is preserved across a crash (again, ignore \( \widehat{\psi} \)) and the most recent recovered state \( \sigma_r \) has to be at least \( \sigma \). In contrast, a store lower bound clearly offers no knowledge after a crash as it only deals with the weak memory order. But what about a flush lower bound? A flush lower bound (and the flush and fence it represents) provides no knowledge of the state of the persistent memory, and as such it too has no meaningful interaction with the post-crash modality. Its effect is more subtle and only restricts the order of persists, as in the flush and fence example where the write to \( x \) persists before the write to \( y \). To tease out this effect in the logic we introduce a post-crash-flush modality: \( \langle \text{PCF} \rangle P \) means that \( P \) holds after a crash if we are in the fortunate scenario where everything flushed and fenced actually reached persistent memory before the crash. In this case, a flush lower bound is just as good as a persist lower bound, and PCF-Flush-LB results in the same resources under the post-crash-flush modality as we saw in PC-PERSIST-LB. The post-crash-flush modality is weaker than the post-crash modality (PC-PCF) so the rules for the post-crash modality also applies to it.

The single place where we use the post-crash-flush modality is in the second condition for write assertions in the definition of invariants (Def. 4.1). This condition is necessary to make it possible to transfer invariants across a crash, i.e., it is used to prove soundness of PC INVARIANT. During this proof the write assertion \( \phi \) must be established for the recovered state \( \sigma \). Since \( \sigma \) was recovered, it must have persisted before the crash, and thus anything flushed and fenced prior to \( \sigma \) (that \( \phi \) might know about) is also guaranteed to have persisted. As such, using the post-crash-flush modality in the condition is sufficiently strong, and allows us to use PCF-Flush-LB to show that \( \phi \) holds for the recovered state. We note that, in our example, it is easy to show (using PCF-Flush-LB) that the second condition in Def. 4.1 does indeed hold for \( \phi_{y,ff} \).

By using the rules for the post-crash modality it is now quite trivial to show the crash condition at every program point in the pre-crash code. And with the resources after the crash established, proving the recovery code is also straightforward. If reading 1 from \( y \) the recovery code learns that \( \sigma_y = \top \) and acquires the resource \( x \geq_t \top \) from the invariant. The flush lower bound can be weakened to \( x \geq_s \top \) per LB-PERSISTENT-FLUSH-STORE, and combined with \( x \leftrightarrow_{na} [\sigma_x] \) the rule MAPSTO-NA-STORE-LB implies that \( \top \subseteq \sigma_x \), which in turn means that \( \sigma_x = \top \). With that established reading \( x \) is sure to result in 37 just as what we saw in the message passing example.

**Subjectivity.** We now take a step back and consider an issue that we have so far swept under the rug. Propositions in Spirea can be subjective. That is, describe facts that are true from one thread’s perspective, but that are not necessarily true from the point of view of other threads. For instance, after the left thread in Fig. 8 has flushed \( x \) it knows \( \langle PF \rangle x \geq_t \top \). But, as a flush by one thread provides no orderings across threads, it would be unsound to transfer this resource to another thread. We thus need to make certain restrictions on resource transfer. We accomplish this with three comonadic modalities. The no-buffer modality, \( \langle \text{NB} \rangle P \), means that \( P \) does not contain any of the post-fence modalities. The first condition in Def. 4.1 uses this modality to ensures that the described unsound transfer is not possible. Write assertions that invoke \( \langle PF \rangle \) or \( \langle PF_S \rangle \) do not pass this requirement. The no-flush modality, \( \langle \text{NF} \rangle P \), adds the requirement that \( P \) does not contain knowledge of flushes \( \ell \geq_t \sigma \). Assertions of the form \( \langle \text{NF} \rangle P \) are of interest as they can safely be extracted from the post-fence modality per POST-FENCE-NO-FLUSH. This is what allowed us to ignore the \( \langle PF \rangle \) modality when we applied HT-AT-READ in Fig. 7 as the \( Q \) we picked did not use flush lower bounds. Finally, the objectively modality, \( \langle \text{obj} \rangle P \), means that \( P \) holds at all points of view of the memory and thus that it is always sound to transfer \( P \) between threads. Examples are \( \ell \geq_p \sigma \) and

\footnote{The name refers to the fact that flushes use a buffer in the operational semantics.}
One use of this modality is in \texttt{HT-AT-READ} where it ensures that the reading thread can not transfer subjective resources to other reading threads.

\textit{State-Change Function.} The final component of invariants that we still have not seen is \textit{state-change functions.} To understand the need for these, consider how we would verify the optimized message passing example in Fig. 2d. Similar to the verification in Fig. 8, the write to \( z \) need to carry with it the knowledge \( x \preceq_f \top \). In order for the left thread to have this knowledge it must acquire \( x \preceq_s \top \) when reading \( y \). As such, the write assertion for \( y \) must have the form \( \phi_y^\top(\top, v) \triangleq v = 1 \ast x \preceq_s \top \). However, as there are no fences between the writes to \( x \) and \( y \), if the \textit{recovery code} were to read \( y \) it would be unsound for it to gain the knowledge \( x \preceq_s \top \). In other words, the write to \( y \) serves to transfer a resource to concurrently running threads that should not be available to recovery code. To capture this, a monotone \textit{state-change function} \( \psi \) can change the state of a write after a crash. The idea is that if a write corresponds to the state \( \sigma \) before a crash, it then corresponds to \( \psi(\sigma) \) after the crash. This is evident by looking at the crash related rules in Fig. 5 where states under the post-crash modality always have \( \psi \) applied to them. In examples where the above issue does not arise, the state-change function can simply be the identity function, and then the \( \psi \)'s can be ignored as we have done so far.

In order to verify the optimized message passing example we can extend the set of states for \( y \) with an additional state \( \sigma_{pc} \) that is below the two other states. The state-change function transitions every write into this state at a crash: \( \psi(\sigma) \triangleq \sigma_{pc} \). The write assertion for this state is simply \( \phi_y(\sigma_{pc}, v) \triangleq v = 0 \lor v = 1 \). This ensures that if the recovery code were to read \( y \) it would gain no information whatsoever while still allowing for the desired resource transfer to work.

\textit{Summary.} We have now completed our tour of Spirea. We hope it has become clear that it supports thread-local modular reasoning by extending ideas from separation logic, in particular ownership and resource transfer, with a range of modalities, which allow us to capture the subtle conditions under which resource transfer is sound.

5 SOUNDNESS

In this section we present an overview over the operational semantics of \( \lambda_{pmem} \), state the soundness theorem of Spirea, and give an overview of the model, including some of the details. Readers who are more interested in seeing Spirea applied to examples can proceed to our case studies in §6.

5.1 Operational Semantics

The semantics of \( \lambda_{pmem} \) is a small-step interleaving operational semantics. Like prior such semantics for weak memory, it is based on \textit{views}. For instance, Bila et al. created a view-based operational semantics for the x86 and ARM persistency models [Bila et al. 2022].

The small-step semantics is lifted to a big-step \textit{recoverable execution relation} of the form \( e_r; \rho \Rightarrow_t \rho'; s \). Here, \( e_r \) is the recovery expression to execute after a crash, \( \rho \) and \( \rho' \) are machine configurations, and \( s \in \{\text{NotCrashed}, \text{Crashed}\} \) is a crash-status. A machine configuration contains the state of entire machine, in particular the memory and all threads. The meaning of the relation is then: a machine in state \( \rho \) can execute to state \( \rho' \) with zero or more crashes along the way where \( e_r \) is executed after every crash. The crash-status indicates whether the execution has been crash free or not. If \( s = \text{NotCrashed} \) the execution was crash free and otherwise if \( s = \text{Crashed} \) then one or more crashed occurred. As we see below the soundness theorem is stated in terms of the recoverable execution relation.

The full operational semantics appears in the appendix [Vindum and Birkedal 2023b].
5.2 Soundness

Before we state the soundness theorem we define the safety result that the soundness theorem implies.

Definition 5.1 (safe). For expressions $e$ and $e_r$, memory configuration $M$, and meta-level predicates on values $\Phi$ and $\Phi_r$, $\text{safe}(e, e_r, M, \Phi, \Phi_r)$ holds if, for any recoverable execution

$$e_r; \langle M, [\langle e, (\bot, \bot, \bot) \rangle] \rangle \Rightarrow_r \langle M, \bar{\ell} \rangle; s$$

it is the case that: (1) For every thread $\langle e, T \rangle \in \bar{\ell}$, if $e$ is not a value then the thread is not stuck. (2) For $\langle e', T \rangle = (\bar{\ell})_1$, if $e'$ is a value $v$ (i.e., the initial expression $e$ terminated) then $\Phi(v)$ holds if $s = \text{NotCrashed}$ and $\Phi_r(v)$ holds if $s = \text{Crashed}$.

Theorem 5.2 (soundness). Given expressions $e$ and $e_r$, meta-level predicates on values $\Phi$ and $\Phi_r$, a finite set of location $L$, and for each $\ell \in L$: an access mode $a_\ell$, an invariant $\pi_\ell$, a state $\sigma_\ell \in \pi_\ell.\phi$ (i.e., an element of the state of the invariant $\pi_\ell$). Let $R$ be the resource

$$\bigstar_{\ell \in \text{dom}(h)} [\ell \pi_\ell] * \ell \mathrel{\geq_p} \sigma_\ell * \ell \mathrel{\rightarrow_{a_\ell}} \sigma_\ell.$$

If $R \Rightarrow \bigstar_{\ell \in \text{dom}(h)} \pi_\ell.\phi(\sigma_\ell, v_\ell)$ and the recovery Hoare triple $\{R\} e \cup e_r \{\Phi \} \{\Phi_r\}$ holds where $h(\ell) = (v_\ell, \bot, \bot, \bot)$ and where $P(\ell) = 0$ for all $\ell \in L$.

This theorem applies to a memory that is not necessarily empty to begin with. When applying the soundness theorem one then gets to pick, for each location, its access mode, invariant, initial state, etc. The resource $R$ then contains the resources for all locations. It must then be shown that the invariants hold for the initial states, and to do this one can use $R$. This is such that the initial invariants can use resources (persistent lower bounds, points-to predicates, etc.) for other locations.

5.3 Model

We give a brief overview of the model of Spirea and highlight some of the underlying key ideas.

Overall Structure. Spirea is modeled atop a lower-level logic that we call BaseSpirea. BaseSpirea is constructed as an instantiation of Perennial’s program logic framework based on the Iris base logic. This framework gives BaseSpirea basic definitions of the three Hoare triples/quadruples. Based on these we define various assertions to represent the physical state, define a post-crash modality, and prove program rules. However, these program proof rules directly expose the intricacies of the operational semantics, such as views, timestamps, and histories, and thus, while perfectly capable of verifying programs, BaseSpirea is quite tedious to use. We explain BaseSpirea in more detail in the appendix [Vindum and Birkedal 2023b]. To provide the more abstract reasoning rules of Spirea, we use BaseSpirea to model Spirea. It is at this level that we add crash-aware invariants, the facilities for handling persistent memory instructions without explicit mention of views, and a post-crash modality that works for the higher-level assertions.

Crash-Aware Invariants. As mentioned in the introduction, a key challenge w.r.t. the model of Spirea’s crash-aware invariants is that it is not clear how Iris invariants can be reconciled with crashes. We therefore take a different approach to invariants than other Iris-based logics for weak memory in that we do not model our crash-aware invariants using Iris invariants. Instead our model includes the resources for invariants inside the state interpretation. The state interpretation is a resource that is threaded through Hoare triples/quadruples in the program logic. With this approach the content of invariants is only available in the context of a Hoare triple/quadruple (as opposed to Iris invariants that can be accessed independently of a program). However, this is the case already in prior logics for weak memory, as accessing invariants in a weak memory model
needs physical synchronization. The benefit of our approach is that when a crash occurs (more precisely, when proving soundness of \( \text{HTR-Idempotence} \)), the resources belonging to all invariants are found inside the state interpretation, and can then be systematically updated to account for the crash.

**Post-Crash Modality.** We explain our post-crash modality with a simplified sketch of its model that highlights the key ideas.

\[
\llbracket (PC) P \rrbracket \triangleq \lambda T. \forall \vec{y}_{\text{new}}. R(\vec{y}_{\text{old}}, \vec{y}_{\text{new}}) \rightarrow R(\vec{y}_{\text{old}}, \vec{y}_{\text{new}}) \ast \llbracket P \rrbracket (\bot, \bot, \bot, \vec{y}_{\text{new}})
\]

The semantic domain of propositions in Spirea is monotone predicates over thread views and a record of ghost names (denoted \( \vec{y} \)). This explains why the model of the modality is a function taking two such arguments. Since resources are changed by a crash, new ghost resources along with new ghost names are introduced after a crash. The universal quantifier is over any such new record of new ghost names. However, the new resources are, to some extent, related to the old resources. The relationship is represented by the exchange resource \( R \), which makes it possible to exchange old resources (valid before the crash) into new resources (valid after the crash). This works through rules of the form \( P_{\text{old}} \ast R(\vec{y}_{\text{old}}, \vec{y}_{\text{new}}) \Rightarrow P_{\text{new}} \ast R(\vec{y}_{\text{old}}, \vec{y}_{\text{new}}) \). Here \( P_{\text{old}} \) could be a points-to predicate before the crash and \( P_{\text{new}} \) would then be an updated points-to predicate corresponding to the physical state after the crash. When proving soundness of a rule such as \( \text{PC-na-mapsto} \) we then use the exchange resource to acquire the updated predicate. Note that as \( R \) appears in the conclusion, it can perform these exchanges without being consumed itself. This is necessary to prove rules such as \( \text{mod-sep} \) for the post-crash modality. The definition of \( R \) is rather extensive as it must allow for resource exchanges for all the various resources used in the model. Establishing \( R \) is done in the soundness proof of \( \text{HTR-Idempotence} \). This rule is given an assumption involving a post-crash modality, and to extract the resource under it, \( R \) must be procured.

6 CASE STUDIES

In order to demonstrate the usefulness of our logic we have used it to verify several case studies.

6.1 Read-Optimized Reference

To show how Spirea supports modular specifications, we give in Fig. 9 a specification of a library implementing what we call read-optimized references. This module implements an interface that appears to clients as a single reference that can be read and written. The implementation however optimizes the performance of reads. It does this by storing the content of the reference redundantly both in a “volatile” location (one can imagine it being stored in faster volatile memory) and in a persistent location (in the slightly slower persistent memory). When a client writes to the read-optimized reference the value it is saved to both locations, but when reading only the volatile reference is consulted for improved performance.

In the specification, an abstract (existentially quantified) predicate \( \text{isRR}(vr, o) \) is used to abstract over (hide from clients) the concrete data representation used by the library implementation; intuitively, it means that the value \( vr \) is a read optimized value with value \( o \). After a crash, the volatile location might be lost and hence the reference needs to be recovered before it can be used after a crash. The abstract predicate \( \text{recRR}(vr, o) \) intuitively means that \( vr \) needs recovery. Just like in the verification of the flush and fence example we choose a crash condition that directly contains the post-crash modality. This simplifies the specification, in particular, in the crash condition for write. During the execution of write, after updating the volatile location but before updating the persistent location, the read-optimized reference is in an inconsistent state where it satisfies neither \( \text{isRR} \) for the old value nor the new value. Instead of trying to express this intermediate state
we can not verify the spin lock in Spirea. Instead we verify the spin lock in BaseSpirea but give
we give the client what they actually need: the information that after a crash the read-optimized
They call this example the atomic persists
verify the rest of the example purely in Spirea. This demonstrates both how to use BaseSpirea in
used both internally in the lock and in the two clients. Hence, if the lock implementation is changed,
the lock implementation will only affect this proof and not the verification of the clients. For more
details see appendix or the full proof in our Coq mechanization.

6.2 Atomic Persists
Raad et al. [2020a] used the POG logic to verify an example where one thread writes to two locations,
flushes and fences the writes, and transfers the information to a second thread through a spin lock.
They call this example the atomic persists example. Due to the limitations of the CAS rule in Spirea
we can not verify the spin lock in Spirea. Instead we verify the spin lock in BaseSpirea but give
it a specification inside Spirea. We give the lock a crash-aware lock specification, similar to the
reference is recoverable in either the old or the new state.

Fig. 9. Implementation and specification of the read-optimized reference

Fig. 10. Implementation of the durable Treiber stack

we give the client what they actually need: the information that after a crash the read-optimized reference is recoverable in either the old or the new state.

Our Coq mechanization contains the full proof of the specification.

6.2 Atomic Persists
Raad et al. [2020a] used the POG logic to verify an example where one thread writes to two locations,
flushes and fences the writes, and transfers the information to a second thread through a spin lock.
They call this example the atomic persists example. Due to the limitations of the CAS rule in Spirea
we can not verify the spin lock in Spirea. Instead we verify the spin lock in BaseSpirea but give
it a specification inside Spirea. We give the lock a crash-aware lock specification, similar to the
one found in Perennial [Chajed 2022, Chapter 3]. With the lock verified in BaseSpirea we can then verify the rest of the example purely in Spirea. This demonstrates both how to use BaseSpirea in combination with Spirea and modularity. In the proof given by Raad et al. [2020a] the lock and the clients are verified together using one global invariant that contains knowledge about the locations used both internally in the lock and in the two clients. Hence, if the lock implementation is changed, the entire proof is affected. In our proof the lock is given a modular specification and a change in the lock implementation will only affect this proof and not the verification of the clients. For more details see appendix or the full proof in our Coq mechanization.

Concurrent non-blocking data structures have the property that they can be made durable and crash-safe by appropriately inserting flushes and fences [Friedman et al. 2020; Izraelevitz et al. 2016]. They furthermore enjoy null-recovery. As mentioned, this is the property that no recovery code is needed after a crash to restore the consistency of the data structure. Data structures with this property are by construction always in a consistent state—even after a crash. This makes them particularly well suited in a persistent setting and easier to use as clients of such data structures do not need to carry out recovery procedures (in contrast to, for instance, the read optimized reference). One would therefore hope to be able to derive similarly easy to use CSL specifications for such data structures. In this section we show how this is the possible in Spirea and explain how to specify and verify safety (including thread-safety and crash-safety) of non-blocking data structures with null-recovery. In our Coq mechanization we have verified durable implementations of both the Treiber stack and the Michael-Scott queue. These case studies show that our crash-aware invariants are sufficiently expressive to capture representation predicates for durable concurrent data structures and capable of handling null-recovery.

For space reasons we cover only the Treiber stack in this section. We focus on the resulting specification and sketch the proof. The full verification of both examples appears in our mechanization.

6.3.1 Implementation. The Treiber stack consists of a pointer to a linked list where, for thread-safety, the pointer is updated with CAS. The implementation of the stack appears in Fig. 10. We use pointers to sums to represent nodes in the linked list: \( \text{inj}_1() \) represents a nil-node and \( \text{inj}_2(v, \ell) \) represents a cons-node with value \( v \) and with \( \ell \) pointing to the succeeding node. In order to make the stack crash-safe we have inserted flushes and fences appropriately.

Our implementation is buffered durable linearizable, which means that it never waits (with \( \text{fence}_{\text{sync}} \)) for an operation to reach persistent memory, but only ensures (with \( \text{fence} \)) that operations persist in the order in which they linearize. This improves performance but means that at a crash some returned operations might be lost. As is common for such data structures we include a sync operation that explicitly makes sure that the stack is persisted by using \( \text{fence}_{\text{sync}} \).

6.3.2 Specification. The specification (in Fig. 11) enforces that a predicate \( \phi : \text{VAL} \rightarrow \text{dProp} \) holds for each item in the stack. The specifications make use of an abstract (existentially quantified) representation predicate \( \text{isStack} \), which is persistent, in the Iris sense, and hence duplicable, so that several threads can access the stack concurrently. Since \( \text{isStack} \) is persistent it does not need to appear in crash-conditions and hence we can use normal Hoare triples instead of crash Hoare triples. As such, the non-highlighted part forms a completely typical per-item CSL specification for a concurrent stack. This is exactly what we want, as it implies that a client can use the durable stack as they would a normal stack. Note that our specification does not imply linearizability or the LIFO property of the stack, but it does imply thread-safety and crash-safety.

The three highlighted rules are specific for persistent memory. The first of these shows that by running \( \text{sync} \) \( \ell \) one gets the resource \( \text{synced}(\ell) \) which is evidence that the stack has been persisted. The two last rules concern the interaction between \( \text{isStack} \) and the post-crash modalities. The first rule states that if \( \ell \) is a stack before a crash then after a crash it is still a stack, but only under the
\begin{align*}
\text{synced}(\ell) & \triangleq \ell \trianglerighteq p \\
isStack(\ell, \phi) & \triangleq \ell \llbracket \phi_{\text{stack}}(\phi) \rrbracket \star \ell \rightsquigarrow \at \\
\phi_{\text{stack}}(\phi)(\_, v) & \triangleq \exists \ell_\ell, x \in \text{List}(\text{Val}). v = \ell_\ell \star \bigstar_{x \in xs} \phi(x) \star \text{isNode}(\ell, x) \\
isNode(\ell_{\text{node}}, []) & \triangleq \exists q. \ell_{\text{node}} \llbracket \text{inj}_1 \rrbracket \star \ell_{\text{node}} \rightsquigarrow q_{na} \star \ell_{\text{node}} \trianglerighteq f \\
isNode(\ell_{\text{node}}, x :: xs) & \triangleq \exists \ell_{\text{toNext}}, \ell_{next}, q_{1}, q_{2}, \sigma, i. \ell_{\text{node}} \llbracket \text{inj}_2 \rrbracket (x, \ell_{\text{toNext}}) \star \ell_{\text{node}} \rightsquigarrow q_{1_{na}} \star \ell_{\text{node}} \trianglerighteq f \star \\
& \quad \ell_{\text{toNext}} \llbracket \text{toNext} \rrbracket \star \ell_{\text{toNext}} \rightsquigarrow q_{2_{na}} \sigma(i, \ell_{\text{next}}) \star \ell_{\text{toNext}} \trianglerighteq f \star (i, \ell_{\text{next}}) \star \text{isNode}(\ell_{\text{next}}, xs)
\end{align*}

Fig. 12. Invariants and definitions used in the proof of durable concurrent stack

\angle \text{PCF} \angle \text{modality since the stack is buffered. The second rule applies if the stack is certain to have been persisted, as witnessed by synced; in this case the stack is preserved under the \angle \text{PCF} \angle modality.}

The last two rules capture not only crash-safety but also the null-recovery property of the stack. They imply that with no recovery code needed, the isStack representation predicate can be reclaimed after a crash, and thus that a client can safely keep using the stack after a crash.

For the specification to be sound in our weak persistent memory setting, the per-item predicate \( \phi \) must satisfy that for all \( v \in \text{Val} \) it is the case that (1) \( \phi(v) \vdash \langle \text{NB} \rangle \phi(v) \), (2) \( \phi(v) \vdash \langle \text{PCF} \rangle \phi(v) \), and (3) \( \phi(v) \vdash \square \phi(v) \). The first two requirements are necessary to make \( \phi \) safe to transfer between threads and across crashes. The third requirement expresses that \( \phi \) must be persistent (in the Iris sense). This is required for a subtle reason: Since the stack is buffered, operations might return before they persist. Therefore, a value \( v \) can be popped from the stack (at which point the client is given \( \phi(v) \)), and then a crash can happen before the changes by the pop persist. Then, after the crash, \( v \) is still present in the stack, and thus it can be popped again (at which point the client is given \( \phi(v) \) once more). In summary, due to crashes, the same value can be popped several times and hence the resource must be duplicable, i.e., persistent. This requirement holds, for instance, for simple properties such as \( v \) being an even number and for assertions about atomic locations. Had the implementation been non-buffered, i.e., implemented using the synchronous fence, then this requirement could be removed.

6.3.3 Proof (sketch). The proof proceeds by defining the predicates synced and isStack and then verifying that the specifications hold. The definition of synced expresses that \( \ell \) has been persisted. For isStack we use three invariants. In all three the \( \psi \) function is the identity function. Two of the invariants use the abstract state set \( 1 = \{ \star \} \). Elements of this abstract state carry no information, but lower bounds are still meaningful, e.g., \( \ell \trianglerighteq f \star \) means that location \( \ell \) has certainly been flushed.

For a node the pointer to the sum never changes. For these locations we use the constant invariant. Given a value \( v \) the constant invariant \( \pi_{\text{const}}(v) \) has the abstract state 1 and the invariant \( \phi_{\text{const}}(\_, v') \triangleq v = v' \). We use the notation \( [\ell \trianglerighteq v \mid [\ell \llbracket \pi_{\text{const}}(v) \rrbracket] \) for \( [\ell \llbracket \pi_{\text{const}}(v) \rrbracket] \)

The pointer from a cons-node to its successor potentially changes many times in push if the CAS in push fails. For this location we use the invariant \( \pi_{\text{toNext}} \). Its abstract state is \( \mathbb{N} \times \text{Val} \) ordered by the natural numbers in the first component. The invariant is \( \phi_{\text{toNext}} = \lambda (n, v), v', v = v' \).

For the stack itself (the pointer to the head of the linked list) we use the invariant \( \pi_{\text{stack}}(\phi) \). Its abstract state is 1 and the invariant \( \phi_{\text{stack}}(\phi) \) appears in Fig. 12. It states that there exists a logic-level list \( x_\ell \), all of whose elements satisfy \( \phi \), and it uses isNode to recursively express that the structure of the linked list corresponds to \( x_\ell \).

With these definitions and invariants in place the proof that the code satisfies the specification is fairly straightforward; see our Coq mechanization for the details.
We finally remark that a similar (non-persistent, non-weak memory) concurrent stack can be verified in standard Iris [Birkedal and Bizjak 2020]. The Iris proof uses an Iris invariant to define the isStack representation predicate.

7 RELATED AND FUTURE WORK

We now discuss aspects of related work that have not already been treated in the paper.

Logics for Persistent Memory. To our knowledge, there are only two prior program logics for persistent memory, namely Persistent Owicky-Gries (POG) [Raad et al. 2020a] and Pierogi [Bila et al. 2022]. Both POG and Pierogi focus on the persistent memory model of the x86 architecture [Raad et al. 2020a], which is stronger, both in terms of weak and persistent memory, than our memory model, which does not include details specific for any one architecture; instead it is a slight generalization of the persistent memory models in x86 and ARM. The programming languages covered by POG and Pierogi are much simpler than ours, $\lambda_{p\text{mem}}$; the languages in op. cit. support only a static number of threads running sequential commands, and a static number of memory locations. In contrast, $\lambda_{p\text{mem}}$ includes more high-level features such as higher-order functions and dynamic allocation of threads and locations.

Both POG and Pierogi are Owicky-Gries-style program logics. POG makes use of rely-guarantee style reasoning to support composition of threads that do not interfere, whereas Pierogi does not support thread-local reasoning. In contrast, Spirea is a separation logic and hence it supports frame rules and thread-local reasoning. Moreover, since Spirea is built on top of Iris, it includes advanced features such as user-definable ghost state and higher-order quantification, which are not present in POG or Pierogi but which are important for modular specification and verification of libraries, such as the stack case study we considered in §6.3. From Perennial we gain the ability to reason about durable resources in a convenient fashion using normal separation logic ownership.

In contrast to POG but similarly to Pierogi, our Spirea logic is mechanized in a proof assistant. Pierogi has been mechanized in Isabelle/HOL and its authors report that the Sledgehammer tool can be used to search automatically for program proof rules to apply. In contrast, we make use of the Iris Proof Mode [Krebbers et al. 2017] to support interactive development of program proofs in the Coq style, which works well for our higher-order logic and larger examples.

Similarly to Pierogi, Spirea supports reasoning directly about optimized flushes (write-backs) (flush) and the use of fences. In contrast, POG only supports reasoning about a stronger operation that combines the write back and the fence. To handle other programs they instead offer a translation that in some cases can translate a program with the weaker, and more tricky to reason about, instructions into equivalent programs. This translation only works for programs that use these instructions in a certain pattern, and programs that do not adhere to this pattern can not be reasoned about using their logic. Since we handle these operations directly we can verify such programs.

Finally, POG and Pierogi have, to the best of our knowledge, only been applied to reason about very small programs consisting of only a few lines, whereas we have used Spirea to verify larger programs, in particular entire data structures. Additionally we have shown how to give such data structures modular specifications as extensions of traditional CSL specifications.

Separation Logic for Weak Memory. GPS [Turon et al. 2014] is a program logic for the release-acquire and non-atomic fragment of the C11 weak memory model. The logic introduced protocols to reason about atomic location, the inspiration for our crash-aware invariants. GPS does not use protocols for non-atomic locations, but instead a standard points-to predicate. As mentioned, this approach is not sufficient in a persistent setting. The CAS rule in GPS does not require that (what we call) the invariant for the read value is preserved. When reading $v_1$ and simultaneously writing $v_2$ with a CAS, the CAS rules in GPS allows one to use the invariant for $v_1$ to show the invariant...
for $v_2$ and keep any additional resources without reestablishing the invariant for $v_1$. This is sound because the C11 semantics ensures that no CAS operation will ever read $v_1$ again. While this is also the case in our semantics, after a crash, the write for $v_1$ might have been persisted while the write for $v_2$ has not been persisted. Then another CAS operation might read $v_1$ again. Hence, in the presence of crashes the GPS CAS rule is unsound. Our rule for CAS requires that the invariant still holds for the read value, ensuring that the invariant always holds for all writes. This is sound even with crashes but is significantly more limiting than the GPS CAS rule. Essentially, the GPS CAS rule is sound for transferring resources between concurrently running CAS-operations, but not across crashes. Our CAS rule is sound for transferring resources across crashes, but only in a limited way between concurrent CAS'es. Creating a CSL rule that is simultaneously sound for both is very challenging and something that we would like to explore in future work. The CAS rule in BaseSpirea does not suffer from this limitation, and as demonstrated in §6.2, it can be used together with Spirea for cases where a stronger CAS rule would otherwise be needed.

The read rule for atomic locations in GPS does not make it possible to transfer exclusive resources out of the invariant for the value read. Our read rule makes it possible to extract exclusive resources as long as the invariant still holds (for instance by transferring other resources into the invariant). We make use of this capability to verify the message passing examples. In GPS an additional feature, escrows, is needed to verify the message passing examples.

Our use of modalities to reason about fences is inspired by Fenced Separation Logic (FSL), a program logic that supports reasoning about the release and acquire memory fences in the C11 memory model [Doko and Vafeiadis 2016]. FSL includes two fence modalities to describe resources that have been prepared for release or acquire by a release or acquire fence. The release and acquire fences in C11 serve a different purpose than those in $\lambda_{pmem}$ and the modalities in FLS are correspondingly different as well.

Recently, in the context of weak memory we have seen logics that support specifications that go beyond safety. Compass [Dang et al. 2022] and Cosmos [Mével and Jourdan 2021] are both capable of showing stronger correctness results by using logically atomic triples as specifications. In contrast, our specification for the durable stack only implies safety. We think it would be interesting to investigate how ideas from these logics apply in our setting and we believe that a stronger CAS rule (per the discussion above) is necessary to achieve this.

**Separation Logics for Durable Storage.** Crash Hoare Logic [Chen et al. 2016] and the more advanced Perennial [Chajed 2022; Chajed et al. 2019, 2021] are separation logics capable of verifying crash-safety. In contrast to our work, Crash Hoare Logic and prior work using Perennial has only considered sequentially consistent memory and synchronously persisting writes without any weak behavior. When writes persist synchronously/atomically the content of durable storage is always in a single certain state. Therefore, rules for the post-crash modality include no non-determinism and are simpler “either/or” rules where some (volatile) resources are entirely lost at a crash and other (non-volatile) resources are preserved unchanged after a crash. In our setting, since the crash step is non-deterministic, the rules for the post-crash modality are significantly more involved. Consider for instance a rule such as $PC/hyphen.sc/n.sc/a.sc/hyphen.sc/m.sc/a.sc/p.sc/s.sc/t.sc/o.sc$ which illustrates that the post-crash modality both introduces non-determinism (the quantified $i$), potentially takes resources away (represented both by $\langle ifRec$ and the lost states), and potentially adds new resources (the crashedIn($\ell$, $\sigma_i$)).

**Persistency Models.** While our focus in this paper is on the logic, we remark on related work on persistency models. As mentioned, persistency models of the x86 and ARM architecture have been formalized [Khyzha and Lahav 2021; Raad et al. 2020b, 2019]. In parallel with our work, new variants of these that, like our semantics, are based on views have been presented [Cho et al. 2021]. It would be interesting to formally verify a correspondence between the explicit epoch persistency
model and the x86 and ARM persistency models. We believe that our operational semantics could be used for this purpose. It would also be worthwhile to show an equivalence between our operational model and a model in a declarative or axiomatic style.

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