

# CFEM Workshop on New Trends in Mechanism Design

6-9 September 2011



## CONFERENCE VENUE

### **Copenhagen Business School**

CBS-Simi Executive Building

Råvarebygningen

PorcelænsHAVEN 22

2000 Frederiksberg

Auditorium PHR120

## Tuesday, 6 September

*Session Chair: Peter Bogetoft*

- 9.10 Welcome by Peter Bogetoft
- 9.15 Peter Cramton: Tutorial on Incentive Auctions
- 10.00 Break
- 10.15 Jason Hartline: Tutorial on Approximation in Mechanism Design
- 11.00 Break
- 11.15 Jason Hartline: Tutorial on Approximation in Mechanism Design (ctd)
- 12:00 General questions and discussion
- 12.15 Lunch break (lunch is on your own)

*Session Chair: Felix Fischer*

- 13.30 Hervé Moulin: The bipartite rationing problem (joint work with Jay Sethuraman)
- 14.15 Daniel Monte: The Daycare Assignment Problem
- 14.45 Coffee break
- 15.15 Peter Biro: Matching couples with Scarf's algorithm
- 15.45 Ron Lavi: Efficiency of Sequential English Auctions with Dynamic Arrivals
- 16.15 Jens Leth Hougaard: Truth-telling and Nash equilibria in minimum cost spanning tree models

## Wednesday, 7 September

*Session Chair: Peter Bogetoft*

- 09.15 Peter Cramton: Tutorial on Medicare Auction Reform
- 10.00 Break
- 10.15 Tim Roughgarden: Tutorial on Algorithmic Mechanism Design
- 11.00 Break
- 11.15 Tim Roughgarden: Tutorial on Algorithmic Mechanism Design (ctd)
- 12.00 General questions and discussion
- 12.15 Lunch Break (lunch is on your own)

*Session Chair: John Kennes*

- 13.30 Jelle Duives: Mathematical Programming Approach to Multidimensional Mechanism Design for Single Machine Scheduling
- 14.00 Timo Heinrich: Reputation and Mechanism Choice in Procurement Auctions: An Experiment
- 14.30 Coffee break
- 15:00 René Kirkegaard: Ranking Asymmetric Auctions using the Dispersive Order
- 15.30 Felix Fischer: Payment Rules for Combinatorial Auctions via Structural Support Vector Machines
- 16.00 Panel Discussion - Chair: Peter Bogetoft

## Thursday, 8 September

*Session Chair: Peter Bogetoft*

- 9.15 Nicole Immorlica: Optimal Auctions over Social Networks
- 10.00 Ning Chen: Mechanism Design without Money via Stable Matching
- 10.30 Break
- 11.00 Nick Gravin: On the power of random sampling in mechanism design
- 11:30 Rick Antle: The Zions Bancorp ESOARS Auctions of 2007 and 2008
- 12.15 Lunch break (lunch is on your own)

*Session Chair: Peter Cramton*

- 13.30 Norovsambuu Tumennasan: Whose Opinion Counts: Political Processes and the Implementation Process
- 14.00 Bartosz Kozłowski: Multi-Attribute Procurement Auctions with Ordered Weighted Reference Information
- 14.30 Coffee break
- 14.45 Kurt Nielsen: A Simplified Multiattribute Procurement Auction with Postponed Scoring by a Double Revelation Mechanism
- 15.15 Open discussion
- 19.00 Conference dinner

## Friday, 9 September

*Session Chair: Peter Bro Miltersen*

- 09.15 Uriel Feige: Mechanism Design with Uncertain Inputs
- 10.15 Paul Dütting: Simplicity-Expressiveness Tradeoffs in Mechanism Design
- 11.00 Break
- 11.15 Jing Chen: Crowdsourced Bayesian auctions
- 12.00 Sven Seuken: Market User Interface Design
- 12.30 Goodbye

*Scientific Organizers:  
Peter Bogetoft, Copenhagen Business School  
Peter Bro Miltersen, Aarhus University*