

FULLY HOMOMORPHIC ENCRYPTION WITH POLYLOG OVERHEAD



Craig Gentry and Shai Halevi
IBM Watson

Nigel Smart
Univ. Of Bristol

Homomorphic Encryption

- Usual procedures (**KeyGen, Enc, Dec**)
 - Say, encrypting bits
- Usual semantic-security requirement
 - $(pk, \text{Enc}_{pk}(0)) \sim (pk, \text{Enc}_{pk}(1))$
- Additional **Eval** procedure
 - Evaluate arithmetic circuits on ciphertexts
 - Result decrypted to the evaluation of the same circuit on the underlying plaintext bits
 - Ciphertext does not grow with circuit complexity
- This work: asymptotically efficient Eval

Contemporary HE Schemes

- The [Gentry'09] approach
 - Ciphertext is noisy (to get security)
 - Noise grows with homomorphic evaluation
 - Until ciphertext is too noisy to decrypt
- Ciphertext is inherently large
 - Need to leave lots of room for noise to grow
 - It takes $\Omega(\lambda)$ -bit ciphertext to encrypt a single bit
 - λ is the security parameter
- Implementing each binary arithmetic gate takes at least $\Omega(\lambda)$ time
 - $\Omega(\lambda)$ time just to read the input ciphertexts

Our Result

- Homomorphic evaluation of T-gate binary arithmetic circuits of average width $\Omega(\lambda)$ in time **$T \cdot \text{polylog}(\lambda)$**
- More Generally, a T-gate, W -average-width circuit can be evaluated homomorphically in time $\mathcal{O}(\underbrace{\lceil W/\lambda \rceil}_{\text{time per level}} \cdot \underbrace{\lambda \cdot T/W}_{\text{\# of levels}})$

Our Approach

- Use HE over polynomial rings
- Pack an array of bits in each ciphertext
- Use ring-automorphisms to move bits around in the arrays
- **Efficient data-movement schemes**
 - **Using Beneš/Waksman networks and extensions**

BACKGROUND

- Homomorphic Encryption over Polynomials Rings
- Polynomial-CRT representation, plaintext slots
- Homomorphic SIMD operations

Hom.Enc. Over Polynomial Rings

- Used, e.g., in [BGV'12], [LTV'12], [B'12]
- Native plaintext space is $R \downarrow 2 = \mathbb{Z} \downarrow 2 [X] / \Phi \downarrow m (X)$
 - Binary polynomials modulo $\Phi \downarrow m (X)$
 - $\Phi \downarrow m (X)$ is m 'th cyclotomic polynomial, $\deg = \phi(m)$
 - For our purposes m is an odd number
- Ciphertexts, secret-keys are vectors over $R \downarrow q = \mathbb{Z} \downarrow q [X] / \Phi \downarrow m (X)$ (for some odd q)
- Decryption formula is $pt = \llbracket [ct \bullet sk] \downarrow q \rrbracket \downarrow 2$

Plaintext Algebra (1)

- $\Phi \downarrow m (X)$ irreducible over \mathbb{Z} , but not mod 2
 - $\Phi \downarrow m (X) \equiv \prod_{j=1}^{\ell} F \downarrow j (X) \pmod{2}$
 - F_j 's are irreducible, all have the same degree d
 - degree d is the order of 2 in $\mathbb{Z} \downarrow m \uparrow *$
 - For some m 's we can get $\ell = \phi(m)/d = \Omega(m/\log m)$
- $GF(2 \uparrow d)$ has a primitive m -th root of unity ζ
- $\Phi \downarrow m (X)$ splits over $GF(2 \uparrow d)$ into linear terms, $\Phi \downarrow m (X) \equiv \prod_{j \in \mathbb{Z} \downarrow m \uparrow *} (X - \zeta \uparrow j) \pmod{2}$

Plaintext Algebra (2)

- The $F_{\downarrow j}(X)$'s are products of conjugates
 - For each $F_{\downarrow j}(X)$ there is $t_{\downarrow j} \in Z_{\downarrow m} \uparrow^*$ such that

$$F_{\downarrow j}(X) = (X - \zeta^{\uparrow 1} t_{\downarrow j})(X - \zeta^{\uparrow 2} t_{\downarrow j})(X - \zeta^{\uparrow 4} t_{\downarrow j}) \cdots (X - \zeta^{\uparrow 2^{\uparrow d-1}} t_{\downarrow j})$$
- $T = \{t_{\downarrow 1}, \dots, t_{\downarrow \ell}\}$ represents the quotient group

$Z_{\downarrow m} \uparrow^* / \langle 2 \rangle$

E.g., $Z_{\downarrow 63} \uparrow^*$

| | | | | | | |
|------------|----------|-----------|-----------|-----------|-----------|-----------|
| 32T: | 32 | 34 | 44 | 31 | 29 | 19 |
| 16T: | 16 | 17 | 22 | 47 | 46 | 41 |
| 8T: | 8 | 40 | 11 | 55 | 23 | 52 |
| <u>4T:</u> | <u>4</u> | <u>20</u> | <u>37</u> | <u>59</u> | <u>43</u> | <u>26</u> |
| 2T: | 2 | 10 | 50 | 61 | 53 | 13 |
| T: | 1 | 5 | 25 | 62 | 58 | 38 |

Plaintext Slots

- Plaintext polynomial $a \in R \downarrow 2$ encodes ℓ values
 - $a \cong [\alpha \downarrow 1, \dots, \alpha \downarrow \ell]$, $\alpha \downarrow j = a(\zeta \uparrow t \downarrow j)$
 - Evaluation of a in roots of $\Phi \downarrow m(X)$
 - 1-1 mapping $a \in R \downarrow 2 \leftrightarrow [\alpha \downarrow 1, \dots, \alpha \downarrow \ell] \in GF(2 \uparrow d) \uparrow \ell$
- When working with plaintext bits, use a 's for which each $\alpha \downarrow j$ is a bit
- Ops $+, \times$ work independently on the slots
 - ℓ -**ADD**: $a + a \uparrow \cong [\alpha \downarrow 1 + \alpha \downarrow 1 \uparrow, \dots, \alpha \downarrow \ell + \alpha \downarrow \ell \uparrow]$
 - ℓ -**MUL**: $a \times a \uparrow \cong [\alpha \downarrow 1 \times \alpha \downarrow 1 \uparrow, \dots, \alpha \downarrow \ell \times \alpha \downarrow \ell \uparrow]$

Homomorphic SIMD [SV'11]

SIMD = **S**ingle **I**nstruction **M**ultiple **D**ata

- Computing the same function on ℓ inputs at the price of one computation
- Pack the inputs into the slots
 - Bit-slice, inputs to j 'th instance go in j 'th slots
- Compute the function once
- After decryption, decode the ℓ output bits from the output plaintext polynomial

Aside: an ℓ -SELECT Operation

$$\begin{array}{c} x \\ \begin{array}{|c|c|c|c|c|c|c|} \hline \mathbf{x}_1 & \mathbf{x}_2 & \mathbf{x}_3 & \mathbf{x}_4 & \mathbf{x}_5 & \mathbf{x}_6 & \mathbf{x}_7 \\ \hline 1 & 0 & 0 & 1 & 0 & 1 & 0 \\ \hline \end{array} \end{array} = \begin{array}{|c|c|c|c|c|c|c|} \hline \mathbf{x}_1 & 0 & 0 & \mathbf{x}_4 & 0 & \mathbf{x}_6 & 0 \\ \hline \end{array} + \begin{array}{c} x \\ \begin{array}{|c|c|c|c|c|c|c|} \hline \mathbf{x}_8 & \mathbf{x}_9 & \mathbf{x}_{10} & \mathbf{x}_{11} & \mathbf{x}_{12} & \mathbf{x}_{13} & \mathbf{x}_{14} \\ \hline 0 & 1 & 1 & 0 & 1 & 0 & 1 \\ \hline \end{array} \end{array} = \begin{array}{|c|c|c|c|c|c|c|} \hline 0 & \mathbf{x}_9 & \mathbf{x}_{10} & 0 & \mathbf{x}_{12} & 0 & \mathbf{x}_{14} \\ \hline \end{array}$$


$$\begin{array}{|c|c|c|c|c|c|c|} \hline \mathbf{x}_1 & \mathbf{x}_9 & \mathbf{x}_{10} & \mathbf{x}_4 & \mathbf{x}_{12} & \mathbf{x}_6 & \mathbf{x}_{14} \\ \hline \end{array}$$

- We will use this later

COMPUTING ON DATA ARRAYS


Forget about encryption for the moment...

So you want to compute some function...



ADD and MUL are a *complete* set of operations.

So you want to compute some function using SIMD...




ℓ -ADD and ℓ -MUL are not a complete set of operations!!!
 ... unless, of course, we use $\ell=1$... ☹

Routing Values Between Levels

- We need to map this




- Into that ... so we can use ℓ -add




ℓ -ADD, ℓ -MUL, ℓ -PERMUTE:

a complete set of SIMD ops




ℓ -PERMUTE(π)

ℓ -MULT



ℓ -ADD, ℓ -MUL, ℓ -PERMUTE: a complete set of SIMD ops




ℓ -ADD

| | | | | | | |
|-------|-------|-------|---|---|---|---|
| x_1 | x_3 | x_5 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| + | + | | | | | |
| x_2 | x_4 | | | | | |

| | | | | | | |
|-------|-------|---|---|---|---|---|
| x_2 | x_4 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
|-------|-------|---|---|---|---|---|

ℓ -ADD, ℓ -MUL, ℓ -PERMUTE:

a complete set of SIMD ops



Use ℓ -PERMUTE for routing between circuit levels

- Not quite obvious

Routing Values Between Levels: Three Problems to Solve

1. How to implement ℓ -permute?
 - $a \in R \downarrow 2$ encodes ℓ -array using polynomial-CRT
 - We are given an encryption of a
2. Fan-out: need to **clone** values from high fan-out gates before routing to next level
3. **Big permutation**: For a width- W level, we need a permutation over $2W$ values
 - Implemented using ℓ -permute on ℓ -arrays
 - Even when $W \gg \ell$

1. Implementing ℓ -Permute

- Recall: native plaintext is binary polynomial modulo $\Phi_{\downarrow m}(X)$, $a \in R_{\downarrow 2} = \mathbb{Z}_{\downarrow 2}[X]/\Phi_{\downarrow m}(X)$
- $a \cong [\alpha_{\downarrow 1}, \dots, \alpha_{\downarrow \ell}]$, $\alpha_{\downarrow j} = a(\zeta^{\uparrow t_{\downarrow j}})$
 - $a + a^{\uparrow} \cong [\alpha_{\downarrow 1} + \alpha_{\downarrow 1}^{\uparrow}, \dots, \alpha_{\downarrow \ell} + \alpha_{\downarrow \ell}^{\uparrow}]$
 - $a \times a^{\uparrow} \cong [\alpha_{\downarrow 1} \times \alpha_{\downarrow 1}^{\uparrow}, \dots, \alpha_{\downarrow \ell} \times \alpha_{\downarrow \ell}^{\uparrow}]$
- Is there a natural operation on polynomials that moves values between slots?

Moving Values Between Slots

- [BGV12] use automorphisms $\kappa_{\downarrow j} : a(X) \rightarrow a(X^j)$
 - Similar technique in [LPR'10]
- For the example $m=63$, $T = \{1, 5, 5 \uparrow 2, \dots, 5 \uparrow 5\}$
 - Consider $b = \kappa_{\downarrow 5}(a) = a(X \uparrow 5)$
 - Then $b(\zeta \uparrow 5 \uparrow j) = a((\zeta \uparrow 5 \uparrow j) \uparrow 5) = a(\zeta \uparrow 5 \uparrow j+1)$
 - If $a \cong [\alpha_{\downarrow 1}, \alpha_{\downarrow 2}, \dots, \alpha_{\downarrow \ell-1}, \alpha_{\downarrow \ell}]$ then $b \cong [\alpha_{\downarrow 2}, \alpha_{\downarrow 3}, \dots, \alpha_{\downarrow \ell}, \alpha_{\downarrow 1}]$
- Can be used to shift by any amount
 - The general case a little more complicated

Homomorphic Automorphisms

- Roughly, applying $\kappa \downarrow j$ to the ciphertext $c = \text{Enc}(a)$ yields an encryption of $\kappa \downarrow j(a)$
 - With respect to a different secret key
 - $\kappa \downarrow j(s)$ rather than s
 - But this can be fixed with key-switching
- So we can implement circular shifts
- But we need arbitrary permutations
 - In order to do intra-circuit routing

From Shifts to Arbitrary Permutations



- For every j we can implement rotate-by- j
 - How to implement arbitrary given permutation π ?
- A naïve solution:
 - For every i , let $a \downarrow i = [a \text{ rotated by } \pi(i) - i]$
 - Use a big SELECT on all the $a \downarrow i$'s
 - Pick the slot $\pi(i)$ from $a \downarrow i$
- Implements π , but takes $\Theta(\ell)$ ops
 - Inefficient, we might as well not use SIMD


From Shifts to Arbitrary Permutations

Use Beneš/Waksman Permutation Networks:

- Two back-to-back but 

- Every exchange is controlled by a bit


- Values sent on either straight edges  or cross edges 




- Every permutation can be realized by appropriate setting of the control bits

Realizing Permutation Networks

- Claim: every butterfly level can be realized by two shifts and two SELECTs
- Example:



Realizing Permutation Networks



Realizing Permutation Networks



Realizing Permutation Networks

Claim: every level of the Benes network can be realized by two shifts and two SELECTs

Proof : In every level, all the exchanges are between nodes at the same distance

- Distance 2^i for some i

Can implement all these exchanges using $\text{shift}(2^i)$, $\text{shift}(-2^i)$, and two SELECTs



Realizing Permutation Networks

- Every level takes 2 shifts and 2 SELECTs
- There are $2\log(\ell)$ levels
- ⇒ Any permutation on ℓ -arrays can be realized using $4\log(\ell)$ shifts and $4\log(\ell)$ SELECTs
- Some more complications when ℓ is not a power of two
 - But still only $O(\log \ell)$ operations

Routing Values Between Levels

✓ Implementing ℓ -permute

- Using $X \mapsto X \uparrow j$ to get simple shifts
- Benes network to get arbitrary permutation
- Takes $O(\log \ell)$ operations

2. Cloning values from high fan-out gates

see paper

3. Permutations over $W \gg \ell$ elements

- How to handle large permutations?


Handling Large Permutations

- A width- W level has $n = \lceil W/\ell \rceil$ ℓ -arrays
- How to permute these W values?
 - Using ℓ -ADD, ℓ -MUL, ℓ -PERMUTE

Theorem (Lev, Pippenger, Valiant '84): Any permutation π over $n \cdot \ell$ values (viewed as a rectangle) can be decomposed as $\pi = \pi_3 \circ \pi_2 \circ \pi_1$, where:

- π_1 only permutes within the columns
- π_2 only permutes within the rows
- π_3 only permutes within the columns

Decomposing Permutations



Decomposing Permutations

| | | | | |
|----|----|----|----|----|
| 13 | 18 | 14 | 16 | 12 |
| 15 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 |
| 7 | 8 | 9 | 20 | 19 |
| 2 | 17 | 1 | 11 | 10 |




| | | | | |
|----|----|----|----|----|
| 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |
| 6 | 7 | 8 | 9 | 10 |
| 11 | 12 | 13 | 14 | 15 |
| 16 | 17 | 18 | 19 | 20 |




| | | | | |
|----|----|----|----|----|
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| | | | | |
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Decomposing Permutations

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| | | | | |
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Decomposing Permutations


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| 7 | 8 | 9 | 20 | 19 |
| 2 | 17 | 1 | 11 | 10 |




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| | | | | |
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| | | | | |
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| 1 | 2 | 18 | 19 | 20 |




Decomposing Permutations



Handling Large Permutations


- Input: n such ℓ -arrays (each is a ciphertext)
 - Consider each ℓ -array as a row in $n \times \ell$ matrix
 - We have a permutation π over the $n \cdot \ell$ slots
- Decompose $\pi = \pi_3 \circ \pi_2 \circ \pi_1$
- Row perm's π_2 implemented with ℓ -PERMUTE
 - Permuting each row separately
- Column perm's π_1, π_3 implemented with ℓ -SELECT
 - Permuting all the columns in parallel
 - For each column a different permutation

Permuting The Columns




Implement a Beneš network over each column

Permuting The Columns



Permuting The Columns



Second level in all the networks, etc.

Handling Large Permutations

- The two column permutations, π_1, π_3 :
 - Each level takes $n/2$ ℓ -SELECT operations
 - Level applied to all the networks in parallel
 - $\log(n)$ levels \rightarrow $n \log(n)$ operations for each π_i
- The row permutation, π_2 :
 - n separate applications of ℓ -PERMUTE
 - Each takes $O(\log(\ell))$ operations
 - $O(n \log(\ell))$ operations overall
- Total number of operations is $O(n \log(n) + n \log(\ell)) = O(n \log(n\ell)) = O(W/\ell \log(W))$

Routing Values Between Levels

✓ Implementing ℓ -permute

- Using $X \mapsto X \uparrow j$ to get simple shifts
- Benes network to get arbitrary permutation
- Takes $O(\log \ell)$ operations

2. Cloning values from high fan-out gates

see paper

✓ Permutations over $W \gg \ell$ elements

➔ **Intra-level routing takes $O(W/\ell \log(W))$**

ops

- For a width- W level

Low Overhead Homomorphic Encryption

- Pack inputs into ℓ -arrays
 - ℓ can be made as large as $\Omega(\lambda)$
- SIMD operations to implement each level
- Route values to their place for next level
- Each level takes $\mathcal{O}(\lceil W/\lambda \rceil \cdot \lambda)$ work
- Total work for size- T width- W circuit is $\mathcal{O}(\lceil W/\lambda \rceil \cdot \lambda \cdot T/W)$

QUESTIONS?



Fan-Out and Cloning

| | | | | | | |
|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|
| 2 | 3 | 1 | 1 | 2 | 2 | 1 |
| x_1 | x_2 | x_3 | x_4 | x_5 | x_6 | x_7 |

| | | | | | | |
|-------|-------|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|
| 1 | 2 | 2 | 4 | 1 | 2 | 1 |
| x_8 | x_9 | x_{10} | x_{11} | x_{12} | x_{13} | x_{14} |

intended multiplicity



| | | | | | | |
|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|
| 2 | 1 | 3 | 1 | 2 | 1 | 2 |
| x_{15} | x_{16} | x_{17} | x_{18} | x_{19} | x_{20} | x_{21} |



variables

Fan-Out and Cloning

| | | | | | | |
|----------------|----------------|----------------|----------------|----------------|----------------|----------------|
| 2 | 3 | 1 | 1 | 2 | 2 | 1 |
| x ₁ | x ₂ | x ₃ | x ₄ | x ₅ | x ₆ | x ₇ |

| | | | | | | |
|----------------|----------------|-----------------|-----------------|-----------------|-----------------|-----------------|
| 1 | 2 | 2 | 4 | 1 | 2 | 1 |
| x ₈ | x ₉ | x ₁₀ | x ₁₁ | x ₁₂ | x ₁₃ | x ₁₄ |

| | | | | | | |
|-----------------|-----------------|-----------------|-----------------|-----------------|-----------------|-----------------|
| 2 | 1 | 3 | 1 | 2 | 1 | 2 |
| x ₁₅ | x ₁₆ | x ₁₇ | x ₁₈ | x ₁₉ | x ₂₀ | x ₂₁ |

Sort by intended multiplicity:

| | | | | | | |
|-----------------|----------------|-----------------|----------------|----------------|----------------|----------------|
| 4 | 3 | 3 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 2 |
| x ₁₁ | x ₂ | x ₁₇ | x ₁ | x ₅ | x ₆ | x ₉ |

| | | | | | | |
|-----------------|-----------------|-----------------|-----------------|-----------------|----------------|----------------|
| 2 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 1 | 1 |
| x ₁₀ | x ₁₃ | x ₁₅ | x ₁₉ | x ₂₁ | x ₃ | x ₄ |

| | | | | | | |
|----------------|----------------|-----------------|-----------------|-----------------|-----------------|-----------------|
| 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 |
| x ₇ | x ₈ | x ₁₂ | x ₁₄ | x ₁₆ | x ₁₈ | x ₂₀ |

Fan-Out and Cloning

| | | | | | | |
|----------|-------|----------|-------|-------|-------|-------|
| 4 | 3 | 3 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 2 |
| x_{11} | x_2 | x_{17} | x_1 | x_5 | x_6 | x_9 |

| | | | | | | |
|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|-------|-------|
| 2 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 1 | 1 |
| x_{10} | x_{13} | x_{15} | x_{19} | x_{21} | x_3 | x_4 |

| | | | | | | |
|-------|-------|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|
| 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 |
| x_7 | x_8 | x_{12} | x_{14} | x_{16} | x_{18} | x_{20} |

Replicate

| | | | | | | |
|----------|-------|----------|--|--|--|--|
| 4 | 3 | 3 | | | | |
| x_{11} | x_2 | x_{17} | | | | |

Replicate and shift

| | | | | | | |
|--|--|--|----------|-------|----------|--|
| | | | 4 | 3 | 3 | |
| | | | x_{11} | x_2 | x_{17} | |

Fan-Out and Cloning

| | | | | | | |
|----------|-------|----------|-------|-------|-------|-------|
| 4 | 3 | 3 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 2 |
| x_{11} | x_2 | x_{17} | x_1 | x_5 | x_6 | x_9 |

| | | | | | | |
|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|-------|-------|
| 2 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 1 | 1 |
| x_{10} | x_{13} | x_{15} | x_{19} | x_{21} | x_3 | x_4 |

| | | | | | | |
|-------|-------|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|
| 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 |
| x_7 | x_8 | x_{12} | x_{14} | x_{16} | x_{18} | x_{20} |

Merge

| | | | | | | |
|----------|-------|----------|----------|-------|----------|--|
| 4 | 3 | 3 | 4 | 3 | 3 | |
| x_{11} | x_2 | x_{17} | x_{11} | x_2 | x_{17} | |

Fan-Out and Cloning

| | | | | | | |
|----------|-------|----------|-------|-------|-------|-------|
| 4 | 3 | 3 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 2 |
| x_{11} | x_2 | x_{17} | x_1 | x_5 | x_6 | x_9 |

| | | | | | | |
|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|-------|-------|
| 2 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 1 | 1 |
| x_{10} | x_{13} | x_{15} | x_{19} | x_{21} | x_3 | x_4 |

| | | | | | | |
|-------|-------|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|
| 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 |
| x_7 | x_8 | x_{12} | x_{14} | x_{16} | x_{18} | x_{20} |

Replicate, shift, merge

| | | | | | | |
|----------|-------|----------|----------|-------|----------|-------|
| 4 | 3 | 3 | 4 | 3 | 3 | 2 |
| x_{11} | x_2 | x_{17} | x_{11} | x_2 | x_{17} | x_1 |

| | | | | | | |
|-------|-------|-------|----------|----------|----------|----------|
| 2 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 2 |
| x_5 | x_6 | x_9 | x_{10} | x_{13} | x_{15} | x_{19} |

| | | | | | | |
|----------|--|--|--|--|--|--|
| 2 | | | | | | |
| x_{21} | | | | | | |

Replicate, shift

| | | | | | | |
|----------|-------|----------|----------|-------|----------|-------|
| 4 | 3 | 3 | 4 | 3 | 3 | 2 |
| x_{11} | x_2 | x_{17} | x_{11} | x_2 | x_{17} | x_1 |

| | | | | | | |
|-------|-------|-------|----------|----------|----------|----------|
| 2 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 2 |
| x_5 | x_6 | x_9 | x_{10} | x_{13} | x_{15} | x_{19} |

| | | | | | | |
|--|----------|--|--|--|--|--|
| | 2 | | | | | |
| | x_{21} | | | | | |

Fan-Out and Cloning

| | | | | | | |
|----------|-------|----------|-------|-------|-------|-------|
| 4 | 3 | 3 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 2 |
| x_{11} | x_2 | x_{17} | x_1 | x_5 | x_6 | x_9 |

| | | | | | | |
|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|-------|-------|
| 2 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 1 | 1 |
| x_{10} | x_{13} | x_{15} | x_{19} | x_{21} | x_3 | x_4 |

| | | | | | | |
|-------|-------|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|
| 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 |
| x_7 | x_8 | x_{12} | x_{14} | x_{16} | x_{18} | x_{20} |

| | | | | | | |
|----------|-------|----------|----------|-------|----------|-------|
| 4 | 3 | 3 | 4 | 3 | 3 | 2 |
| x_{11} | x_2 | x_{17} | x_{11} | x_2 | x_{17} | x_1 |

| | | | | | | |
|-------|-------|-------|----------|----------|----------|----------|
| 2 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 2 |
| x_5 | x_6 | x_9 | x_{10} | x_{13} | x_{15} | x_{19} |

| | | | | | | |
|----------|----------|--|--|--|--|--|
| 2 | 2 | | | | | |
| x_{21} | x_{21} | | | | | |

| | | | | | | |
|----------|-------|----------|----------|-------|----------|-------|
| 4 | 3 | 3 | 4 | 3 | 3 | 2 |
| x_{11} | x_2 | x_{17} | x_{11} | x_2 | x_{17} | x_1 |

| | | | | | | |
|-------|-------|-------|----------|----------|----------|----------|
| 2 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 2 |
| x_5 | x_6 | x_9 | x_{10} | x_{13} | x_{15} | x_{19} |

Merge

Fan-Out and Cloning

| | | | | | | |
|----------|-------|----------|-------|-------|-------|-------|
| 4 | 3 | 3 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 2 |
| x_{11} | x_2 | x_{17} | x_1 | x_5 | x_6 | x_9 |

| | | | | | | |
|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|-------|-------|
| 2 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 1 | 1 |
| x_{10} | x_{13} | x_{15} | x_{19} | x_{21} | x_3 | x_4 |

| | | | | | | |
|-------|-------|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|
| 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 |
| x_7 | x_8 | x_{12} | x_{14} | x_{16} | x_{18} | x_{20} |

Copy, merge

| | | | | | | |
|----------|-------|----------|----------|-------|----------|-------|
| 4 | 3 | 3 | 4 | 3 | 3 | 2 |
| x_{11} | x_2 | x_{17} | x_{11} | x_2 | x_{17} | x_1 |

| | | | | | | |
|-------|-------|-------|----------|----------|----------|----------|
| 2 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 2 |
| x_5 | x_6 | x_9 | x_{10} | x_{13} | x_{15} | x_{19} |

| | | | | | | |
|----------|----------|-------|-------|--|--|--|
| 2 | 2 | 1 | 1 | | | |
| x_{21} | x_{21} | x_3 | x_4 | | | |

Copy

| | | | | | | |
|----------|-------|----------|----------|-------|----------|-------|
| 4 | 3 | 3 | 4 | 3 | 3 | 2 |
| x_{11} | x_2 | x_{17} | x_{11} | x_2 | x_{17} | x_1 |

| | | | | | | |
|-------|-------|-------|----------|----------|----------|----------|
| 2 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 2 |
| x_5 | x_6 | x_9 | x_{10} | x_{13} | x_{15} | x_{19} |

| | | | | | | |
|-------|-------|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|
| 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 |
| x_7 | x_8 | x_{12} | x_{14} | x_{16} | x_{18} | x_{20} |

Each variable appears at least as much as needed