## galois

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# (Some) Practical Optimizations for Secret Sharing MPC

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#### Context: Linear Secret Sharing

#### $x = (x_1 + x_2 + x_3) \mod 2^n$







- Each x<sub>i</sub> is locally random
- Together, globally meaningful
- Linear, so interpolation simplifies to addition for recovering values
- HBC adversary (for now)
- Secure channels
- Gain security within HBC by:
  - Different architectures
  - Different administrators
  - Different locations
- Or implement more robust model

#### LSS Addition (or XOR)



#### LSS Multiplication (or AND)



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#### Multiplication (or AND)



New entropy during re-share operations prevents A, B, C from learning secrets

#### Promising or Practical?

- AES-128 @ 3ms per block 10<sup>5</sup> too slow
- Corollary of Felten: adding security not compelling
- No "killer apps" publicly identified (yet)
- Our hypothesis: practical applications with compelling benefit
  - Streaming-rate, on-demand cloud privacy
  - Protecting intellectual property AND privacy in e-mail



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#### Sharemonad MPC Machine



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#### Sharemonad eDSL

- Secret-sharing computation language
- Embedded in Haskell for strong FP benefits, or...
- Ad hoc instruction set architecture
- A Sharemonad program is
  - Generated from a code representation
  - An AST
  - Interpreted as a circuit by a target back-end
- Optimize where? Program level AND circuit level

#### Sharemonad Primitives

- Math-like operations on shares
  - multiplication
  - addition, subtraction
  - negation
  - division
- Operations on public values
  - arithmetic mul by public value
  - right bit shift by public value
  - table lookup in public table
- Conversions
  - bit-representation <--> numeric representation
  - list of bits and <-> numeric representation
- Cross-product of bit-wise representation
- Comparisons (eq/lt/lteq/gt/gteq/zero/neg)

- Data types
  - constant value, including unit and zero
  - GF 2 (bits)
  - GF 2<sup>32</sup> (integers)
  - Lists of the above types

# On-demand, streaming cloud privacy Secure VoIP



#### 2-Voice Example





#### First Attempt: Algorithmic





#### Two Parts to Table Lookups



Approach: Public table shared by all proxies Each lookup must access entire table Invariant: 3 shares add to correct intermediate result

#### Data Access



- Demuxed index *d* is shared, table *t* is public
- n-1 index bits have even parity across shares
- 1 index bit has odd parity

- Inner product
  - Whole table structure is traversed locally
  - All table rows except valid one will cancel

 $d = d_A \wedge d_B \wedge d_C$ implies inner d t = inner d\_A t ^ inner d\_B t ^ inner d\_C t

#### Index Construction



#### Index Construction Bandwidth

Index size: 2<sup>16</sup>

n = 16

log<sub>2</sub>(n) communication rounds: 4

 $O(2^{n/2})$  total bits communicated per server: 256 + 256 16 + 16 4 + 4 2 + 2(actual number: 700b)  $700b \ge 3$  servers = 2kb

2kb x 1440 samples x 1/25msec x 4 voice streams processed = 485Mb/s, Oh My!

#### Insight and 3rd Attempt

Table is currently 64k entries Insight: Instead of 64kb index, re-construct table as 256 rows of 256 entries



- Restructure table to 256x256 from 64k x 1
- Share unexpanded final expressions (16b)
- 2-dimensional final lookup against table
  - Cost: 2x as many XORs to compute 2 inner products

#### Index Bandwidth Again

 $O(2^{n/2})$  total bits communicated per server: 16 + 16 4 + 4 2 + 2~ 32b per server

32b x 3 servers = 100b 100b x 1440 samples x 1/25msec x 4 voice streams processed = **2.3 Mb/s** 

#### VoIP Outcome

- 4 voice "accumulators" at 16kB/s sampling rate
- 25ms of processing per incoming 1440-sample block
- 65ms left in for network delay to and from clients
- Amazon ECS VMs for MPC, Apple iPhones for clients

#### Intellectual Property AND Privacy: eMail border guard



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#### Regular Expression Computation

 $RE = (x;y)^{*};x$  Input = "x"

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- Assume
  - Regular expression is public
  - Email string is private (randomly shared)
- Have to compute over all states
  - Non-deterministic finite automaton
- Sequence of "matched" flags form a private (randomly shared) vector





#### Regular Expression Computation

 $RE = (x;y)^*;x \qquad Input = "x"$ Next char = 'y'

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- Assume
  - Regular expression is public
  - Email string is private (randomly shared)
- Have to compute over all states
  - Non-deterministic finite automaton
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Each new input character causes the match state-vector to be updated



#### Circuit Optimization



#### Iterate the Regexp Computation

Goal 2: Expand and re-optimize Possible analogy: loop unrolling 25



#### Simplify the Larger Description



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#### Effect of Circuit Reduction

- Compile multiple (1, 2, 4, 8,...) state steps (corpus characters) as a single circuit
- Organize into communication layers; pack bits into words

	unoptimized				optimized			
input	ands	xors	state	comms	ands	xors	state	comms
1	203	0	358	10	149	15	119	4
2	388	0	358	12	277	27	117	5
4	756	0	358	14	493	53	117	6
8	1492	0	358	19	949	104	117	9
16	2964	0	358	33	1,950	212	117	17

Diminishing Returns

- .\*(((TOP|)SECRET)|TS|S)--(ROCKYBEACH|STINGRAY).\*
- .\*(((TOP|)SECRET)|TS|S)--SI--NO(CON|CONTRACTOR|FOREIGN).\*
- .\*(((TOP|)SECRET)|TS|S|R|RESTRICTED)--(AO|DO|MO|SO|TO)--LIMDIS.\*

.\*ac\*cb.\*



#### Email Border Guard Outcome

- 1-page e-mail
- Classification-marking regexp filter
- ~15s to accept/reject
- Private cloud VMs for MPC, Linux laptops for clients

#### Resource Scheduling

Scheduling of communications Early Late 

#### Conclusions, Future Work

- Optimizations can bring interesting apps to practice
- Communication is often the bottleneck (for LSS at least)
- But...in many settings, traditional crypto protocols are cheaper and faster

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- Futures
  - Additional instructions for our MPC machine
  - Automation for
    - Determination of diminishing returns for circuit optimization
    - Decisions on LUT replacement of instruction sequences
    - Scheduling of communications among share servers
  - Stronger than HBC adversaries

![](_page_31_Picture_0.jpeg)

### Thank you!