2012.02.07

THEORY SEMINAR:

Speaker: Hossein Naeemi, Maastricht University

Title: Implementability in multidimensional domains, a network approach

Abstract: We study implementable (incentive compatible) allocation rules based on a network approach when types are multi-dimensional, the mechanism designer may use monetary transfers, and agents have quasi-linear preferences over outcomes and transfers. We provide a general characterization of implementability. The characterization is based on implementability on lines called line implementability and then we substantiate the characterization in case of different valuation functions. Motivated by results in Archer and Kleinberg (2008) for the case of valuations that are linear in the type, we introduce the notion of local implementability and then we show that whenever revenue equivalence holds on lines local implementability together with line implementability implies implementability. Finally we simplify the characterizations in case of finite outcome space. Thereby we derive a generalization of a well-known theorem by Saks and Yu (2005).

Host: Peter Bro Miltersen