CAGT Seminar: Jim Wilenius, Uppsala University
2007.10.03 |
| Date | Tue Nov 13 |
| Time | 14:15 — 15:15 |
| Location | DI-Turing-014 |
Title: Analyzing Combinatorial vs. Single-Bid Auctions
Speaker: Jim Wilenius, Uppsala University
Time: Tue Nov 13th 2007 14:15-15:15
Location: Turing-014
Abstract:
We study multi-commodity auction where some bidders have synergies between commodities. That is, a bidder getsan extra value if he manages to win all in a specific group of commodities. In such a situation, it is a common belief that the auctioneer gets a better revenue by letting thebidder bid on explicit combinations, a so-called combinatorial auction. However, so far there has been no proof that a combinatorial auction actually gives higher revenue. Indeed, the only existing analysis is for a small auction with two commodities, and where the result is the opposite; it is better for the auctioneer to only allow single bids.
In this work, we provide the first analytical comparison of the revenue with and without combinatorial bids for a multi-commodity auction with more than two commodities. By giving bounds on the optimal bidding strategies for combinatorial and non-combinatorial auctions, we manage to prove that a combinatorial indeed gives higher revenue to the auctioneer.
Joint work with Arne Andersson.