



Leakage Resilient Cryptography

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<http://cs.au.dk/research/areas/cryptography-and-security/>

Cryptography and Security Research Group

CRYPTOGRAPHY AND SECURITY



MEMBERS OF THE CRYPTOGRAPHY AND SECURITY GROUP AT THE DEPARTMENT

Focus points for the Cryptography and Security group

Public-key cryptography, cryptographic protocols, and quantum cryptography. Public-key cryptography draws inspiration from both complexity theory and algebra, more specifically number theory and algebraic geometry, and is extremely useful in practice. The cryptographic protocol research area is experiencing an extremely fast development, where the group contributes both to the basic theory of the field and to efficient constructions and implementations. In quantum cryptography, the group contributes with efficient experimental implementations as well as theoretical work.

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


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Cryptography and Security Research Group

Secure
Multi-party
Computation

Leakage
Resilient
Cryptography



and
more...

Quantum
Cryptography

What is Cryptography?



What is Cryptography?

Wikipedia: “The practice and study of hiding information”

- Most known task is **encryption**
- I.e., the process of transferring information privately against unauthorized user

Encryption Scheme

The classic problem:



sender

message m



receiver

Encryption Scheme

The classic problem:




sender

message m




receiver




eavesdropper

Encryption Scheme

The classic problem:



Encryption Scheme



Encryption Scheme


- Uses a **secret key** to encrypt and decrypt
- Until recently, all constructions assume security of the key is ultimate
 - Attacker cannot obtain **any information** about the key



In Real Life Secrets Do Leak...



In Real Life Secrets Do Leak...



Side Channels Attacks

- Exploiting physical properties of the circuits running cryptographic protocols
 - Analyzing power consumption, running time, electromagnetic radiations and more...
- Circumvent traditional security proofs and break security properties



How to Handle These Attacks?

- Let electrical engineers worry about it
 - Reduce the leakage directly at the implementation (hardware or software) level



How to Handle These Attacks?

- Let electrical engineers worry about it
 - Reduce the leakage directly at the implementation (hardware or software) level
- Problems:
 - Expensive
 - Ad-Hoc: only protects against known attacks



The Cryptographic Approach



- Design leakage resilient cryptographic primitives e.g., encryption scheme
 - Provably allow leakage from the secret key
 - Reduce the security needs at the implementation level

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**Need to define what leaks
and how much**

The Cryptographic Approach

- Leakage is arbitrary




The Cryptographic Approach

- Leakage is arbitrary
- Two axioms:
 1. Leakage does not reveal the entire secret key
 2. Leakage is formulized by a polynomial time commutable function **f**

Modeling Leakage Resilient Encryption Scheme




Message is secure even if the attacker learns something about the secret key



Modeling Leakage Resilient Encryption Scheme



Message is secure even if the attacker learns something about the secret key



Designing Leakage Resilient Encryption Scheme

- Much work has been done so far optimizing leakage parameters
 - Privacy obtained even if **all but small fraction** of the secret key leaks

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 - Privacy obtained even if **all but small fraction** of the secret key leaks
- Many open questions!

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Factoring assumption:
Hard to factor multiplication of
two large primes: $N=p \cdot q$

Designing Leakage Resilient Encryption Scheme

- Problem:
 - Factoring is easy in the presence of leakage from p and q
[RivestShamir85]

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- Problem:
 - Factoring is easy in the presence of leakage from p and q [RivestShamir85]
- Solution:
 - Consider a scheme that doesn't need to use p and q
- Preliminary results:
 - A secret key scheme based on factoring with security in the presence of leakage



Thank you!